Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co.

Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co.
Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co.
	Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 31, 1904; Decided December 19, 1904
Full case name	Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co.
Citations	196 U.S. 1 (more) 25 S. Ct. 158; 49 L. Ed. 363
Case history
Prior	117 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1902)
Court membership
	Chief Justice Melville Fuller Associate Justices John M. Harlan · David J. Brewer; Henry B. Brown · Edward D. White; Rufus W. Peckham · Joseph McKenna; Oliver W. Holmes Jr. · William R. Day
Case opinion
Majority	Fuller, joined by unanimous
Laws applied
	Railroad Safety Appliance Act

Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904), was a case before the United States Supreme Court. It interpreted the words "any car" in the Railroad Safety Appliance Act prohibiting common carriers from using any car in moving interstate commerce not equipped with automatic couplers. In doing so, it overturned the Eighth Circuit in Johnson v. Southern P. Co., 117 F. 462 (8th Cir. 1902)

Background

Facts

August 5, 1900, Johnson was acting as head brakeman on a freight train of the Southern Pacific Company, which was making its regular trip between San Francisco, California, and Ogden, Utah. On reaching the town of Promontory, Utah, Johnson was directed to uncouple the engine from the train and couple it to a dining car, belonging to the company, which was standing on a side track, for the purpose of turning the car around preparatory to its being picked up and put on the next west-bound passenger train. The engine and the dining car were equipped, respectively, with the Janney coupler and the Miller hook, so called, which would not couple together automatically by impact, and it was, therefore, necessary for Johnson, and he was ordered, to go between the engine and the dining car, to accomplish the coupling. In so doing Johnson's hand was caught between the engine bumper and the dining car bumper and crushed, which necessitated amputation of the hand above the wrist.

Trial

The brakeman brought his action in a state district court (District Court of the First Judicial District of Utah). The case was subsequently removed to a federal trial court (Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Utah) on the ground of diversity of citizenship.

On trial, after plaintiff had rested its case, the Court granted defendant's motion to instruct the jury to find in its favor (directed verdict).

Eighth Circuit

Plaintiff carried the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the judgment was affirmed. 117 Fed. Rep. 462.

Certiorari and writ of error

The case was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari, and also on writ of error.

Issues/oral arguments

Appellant claimed that he was relieved of an assumption of risk under common law rules. The case involved the application of a congressional act in respect of automatic couplers, the primary question being whether locomotives were required to be equipped with couplers. Another issue was that the dining car was empty and was not used in moving interstate traffic.

Opinion of the court

The court reversed the judgment below. The court held that whether cars were empty or loaded, the danger to employees was the same. Thus, the dining car was being regularly used in the movement of interstate traffic, so it was within the purview of the law. Its locomotive should have been equipped with couplers because it was obligated by law, and the particular train car was regularly used in the movement of interstate traffic and it was irrelevant that the car was empty at the time of appellant's injuries.

1. Locomotives are embraced by the words "any car" in the act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 531, chap. 196, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3174), 2, prohibiting common carriers from using any car in moving interstate commerce not equipped with automatic couplers, although locomotives were, elsewhere in the statute, in terms required to be equipped with power driving-wheel brakes.

2. The doctrine that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly does not demand that the act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 531, chap. 196, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3174), compelling interstate carriers to adopt automatic couplers, in which there is an undoubted intention to make some change in the existing law, should be so construed as to defeat the obvious object of Congress.

3. The rule that penal statutes are to be construed strictly does not permit such a construction as defeats the obvious intention of the legislature.

4. The equipment of a locomotive and a dining car with automatic couplers, but of such different types as not to couple with each other automatically, does not satisfy the provision of the act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 531, chap. 196, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3174), 2, prohibiting common carriers from using any car in moving interstate commerce not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars.

5. Automatic couplers which will both couple and can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the cars are meant by the provision of the act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 531, chap. 196, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3174), 2, prohibiting common carriers from using any car in moving interstate commerce not equipped with "couplers coupling automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars."

6. A dining car in constant use is, while waiting for the train to be made up for its next interstate trip, "used in moving interstate traffic" within the meaning of the act of March 2, 1893 (27 Stat. at L. 531, chap. 196, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3174), 2, requiring common carriers to equip with automatic couplers any car so used.

References

Text of Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., 196 U.S. 1 (1904) is available from: CourtListener Findlaw Google Scholar Justia Library of Congress