Joseph A. McChristian

Joseph Alexander McChristian (October 12, 1914[1] – May 13, 2005) was a United States Army Brigadier General and the assistant chief of staff for intelligence, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (J-2, MACV) (then commanded by General William Westmoreland) from July 13, 1965 to June 1, 1967.[2] As J-2, MACV, he predicted that the North Vietnamese would attack in full force, which they did during the 1968 Tet offensive. His prediction was unpopular because the official policy was that US and South Vietnamese forces were winning the war.

From August 5, 1968 to his retirement on April 30, 1971, as a Major General, he was assistant chief of staff for intelligence in the Department of the Army.[3]^:378

McChristian is a member of the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame.

Notes

Cullum, George Washington; Edward S. Holden. Biographical register of the officers and graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. 8 (3 ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 1276.
Major General Joseph A. McChristian, The Role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 (Vietnam Studies), Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1974 (Library of Congress Catalogue Card number 74-600003)
Scheips, Paul (2005). The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945-1992 (PDF). US Army Center of Military History. ISBN 9781517253783. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.

References

Major General Joseph A. McChristian, The Role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 (Vietnam Studies), Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1974 (Library of Congress Catalogue Card number 74-600003)
Jake Blood, The Tet Effect: Intelligence and the Public Perception of War (Cass Military Studies) Routledge 2005. ISBN 0-415-34997-4

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[Birth-1] Cullum, George Washington; Edward S. Holden. Biographical register of the officers and graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. 8 (3 ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. p. 1276.

[2] Major General Joseph A. McChristian, The Role of Military Intelligence 1965-1967 (Vietnam Studies), Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1974 (Library of Congress Catalogue Card number 74-600003)

[Scheips-3] Scheips, Paul (2005). The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1945-1992 (PDF). US Army Center of Military History. ISBN 9781517253783. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.