Political stagnation

Political stagnation, decline, or decadence is a condition in which a nation, empire, political party,[1] or alliance experiences adverse conditions, ineffective leadership, hesitation, stalemate, or loss of identity.[2] Leaders may be unable to provide: social cohesion,[3] an ideological programme,[4] economic prosperity, morale, law and order,[5] or progress.[6]

The era may be marked by unstable coalitions and policy compromises,[7] discontinuity of purpose, frequent changes of government, corruption, and denial.[8] Conventional politics being seen to fail, there may be an increase in scapegoating, victimisation, rioting, rebellion,[9] terrorism, attempted coups d'etat,[10] assassinations, or other revenge missions. Leaders may see a foreign war as a way out of difficulties, as in the case of Austro-Hungary in 1914.[11]

History of the concept

Ibn Khaldun observed periods, following 'expansion to the limit', when 'the habit of subservience' generated 'lies, ruses and deceit', and possibly a 'split in the dynasty'.[12]

According to Paul Kennedy, 'Great powers in relative decline instinctively respond by spending more on 'security' and thereby…compound their long-term dilemma.'[13]

In the case of an ideocracy, Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz and Alfred Penn see self-destruction as a factor in ideological stagnation. The ideocracy may split into 'warring camps'. It may be ended by a military coup, as in Peronist Argentina. There may be a popular rebellion. The economy may stagnate, as demands exceed ability. There may be external attacks by other states which fear the spread of the ideology,[14] A further possibility is peaceful erosion. A new generation matures which is less fervent and more tolerant of pluralism. Technological developments and artistic expression (for example, the plays of Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia) erode faith in the ideology. The leadership become a less-effective self-serving, careerist elite.[15]

Examples

According to Bruno S. Sergi,[16] Russia experienced 'transformative' leadership under Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, Tsar Alexander II, Lenin and Gorbachev, but stagnation followed in each case. The USSR is said to have suffered stagnation between the early 1970s and its collapse from 1989 to 1991.[17]

Iran under Reza Shah Pahlavi stagnated between 1945-1949 when it failed to deal with the communist threat.[18] His son and successor Mohammad Reza Shah experienced, according to Andrew Scott Cooper, 'economic slowdown, corruption, youth rebellion, a revolutionary underclass, and pressure for reform'. The Shah relied on his White revolution, repression, and the oil boom, but these all failed to keep his regime in power.[19]

John Callaghan and Steve Fielding[20] say that postwar Britain suffered from 'pluralistic stagnation' between 1945–1979 when both parties endorsed the corporatist consensus.

In Israel adherence to the original socialist ideology,[21] and fading hopes for a two-state solution,[22] are factors causing stagnation according to commentators.

See also

References
  1. Ze'ev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 78.
  2. Marta Latek, EU-NATO partnership in stagnation, Briefing Library, European Parliament, 4 September 2012.
  3. Metin Heper, Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980's, De Gruyter, 1988, p. 148.
  4. Robert C. Rowland and David Frank, Shared Land, Conflicting Identity, MSU Press, 2002, chapter nine: "Ideological calcification".
  5. Metin Heper, Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980's, De Gruyter, 1988, p. 148.
  6. Paul Bushkovitch, A Concise History of Russia, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 272.
  7. Andrea Shalal, "German Social Democrats Face Pressure over Coalition Talks", Reuters, 22 November 2017.
  8. Schenker, David (19 December 2012). "Lebanon's Stagnation". The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Retrieved 20 January 2020.
  9. Abbas Alnasrawi, Arab Nationalism, Oil, and the Political Economy of Dependency, Greenwood Publishing, 1991, p. 39.
  10. New York Times editorial: "Ankara's Shame", 21 April 1982.
  11. Gordon Martel, The Myth that Changed the World, Oxford University Press, 2014, prologue.
  12. Muqadimmah, Routledge, 2001, p255
  13. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers.
  14. Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz and Alfred Penn, The Politics of Ideocracy p149-53
  15. Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz and Alfred Penn, The Politics of Ideocracy p154-61
  16. 'Misinterpreting Modern Russia', Bloomsbury, 2011, chapter nine
  17. Mark Katz, Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves, St Martin's Press, 1997, p 85
  18. Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951, Oxford University Press, 1984, chapter three
  19. Andrew Scott Cooper, The Fall of Heaven: the Pahlavis and the final days of Iran, Henry Holt, 2016, p214
  20. Interpreting The Labour Party, Manchester University Press, 2003, p 151
  21. Yakir Plesner, 'The Political Economy of Israel', Middle East Quarterly, March 1999
  22. Dahlia Scheindlin, 'Israelis now face a fateful choice as hopes for a two=state solution fade', The Guardian, 1/1/2017
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.