SEC v. Chenery Corp. (1943)

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80 (1943), is a United States Supreme Court case. It is often referred to as Chenery I, as four years later the case was before the Supreme Court a second time in Chenery II. Chenery I set out what is known as the Chenery Doctrine, a basic principle of U.S. administrative law that an agency may not defend an administrative decision on new grounds not set forth by the agency in its original decision.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation
Argued December 17–18, 1942
Decided February 1, 1943
Full case nameSecurities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation
Citations318 U.S. 80 (more)
63 S. Ct. 454; 87 L. Ed. 626; 1943 U.S. LEXIS 1301
Case history
PriorCert. to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Court membership
Chief Justice
Harlan F. Stone
Associate Justices
Owen Roberts · Hugo Black
Stanley F. Reed · Felix Frankfurter
William O. Douglas · Frank Murphy
Robert H. Jackson
Case opinions
MajorityFrankfurter, joined by Stone, Roberts, Jackson
DissentBlack, joined by Reed, Murphy
Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Background

The respondents, who were officers, directors, and controlling stockholders of the Federal Water Service Corporation (hereafter called Federal), a holding company registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, c. 687, 49 Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. § 79 et seq., brought this proceeding under § 24(a) of the Act to review an order made by the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 24, 1941, approving a plan of reorganization for the company. Under the Commission's order, preferred stock acquired by the respondents during the period in which successive reorganization plans proposed by the management of the company were before the Commission was not permitted to participate in the reorganization on an equal footing with all other preferred stock. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, with one judge dissenting, set the Commission's order aside, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 374, 128 F.2d 303, and, because the question presented looms large in the administration of the Act, we brought the case here.[1]

See also

References

This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.