Battle of Nagysalló

The Battle of Nagysalló, fought on 19 April 1849, was one of the battles between the Habsburg Empire and the Hungarian Revolutionary Army during the Spring Campaign in the Hungarian War of Independence from 1848–1849, fought between the Habsburg Empire and the Hungarian Revolutionary Army. Until 1918 Nagysalló was part of the Kingdom of Hungary; nowadays it is a village in Slovakia, its Slovakian name being Tekovské Lužany. This was the second battle in the second phase of the campaign, whose aim was to break the imperial siege of the fortress of Komárom and at the same time encircle the Habsburg imperial forces headquartered in the Hungarian capitals of Buda and Pest. The Hungarians routed the imperial corps led by Lieutenant General Ludwig von Wohlgemuth, which had come from the Habsburg Hereditary Lands (Vienna, Styria, Bohemia, Moravia), to help the imperial army sent to suppress the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 and independence.

Battle of Nagysalló
Part of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848
Date19 April 1849
Location
around and in Nagysalló and Nagymálas, Kingdom of Hungary
(now Tekovské Lužany and Málaš, Slovakia)
Result Hungarian tactical victory
Belligerents
 Hungarian Revolutionary Army
Polish Legion		  Austrian Empire
Commanders and leaders
 János Damjanich
 György Klapka
 András Gáspár		  Ludwig von Wohlgemuth
Strength
Total: 23,784 men
– I. corps: 9465
– III. corps: 9419
– VII. corps: 4900
87 cannons[1]		 Total: 20,601+? men[2]
55 cannons[3]
Casualties and losses
Total: 608 men Total: 1538 men
– 112 dead
– 189 wounded
– 1237 missing and captured[4]

Background

After the Battle of Vác the Hungarian army continued its advance in accordance with the plan for the second phase of the Spring Campaign as developed on 7 April.[5] According to this plan the Hungarian army was to split: General Lajos Aulich with the Hungarian II Corps, and Colonel Lajos Asbóth's division remained demonstrating in front of Pest to make the imperials believe the whole Hungarian army was there; this would divert the Imperials’ attention from the north, where the real Hungarian attack was to start with I, III and VII Corps moving west along the northern bank of the Danube via Komárom, to relieve it from the imperial siege.[6] Kmety’s division of VII Corps was to cover the three corps’ march. After I and III corps had occupied Vác, Kmety was then to secure the town while they and the two remaining divisions of VII Corps were to advance to the Garam river, then head south to relieve the northern section of the Austrian siege of the fortress of Komárom.[7] After this, they were to cross the Danube and relieve the southern section of the siege.[8] In the event that all of this was successfully completed, the imperials had only two choices: to retreat from Middle Hungary towards Vienna, or to face encirclement in Pest and Buda by the Hungarians.[9] This plan was very risky (as was the first phase of the Spring Campaign too) because if Windisch-Grätz discovered that there was only one Hungarian corps left in front of Pest, he could attack and destroy Aulich's troops, thus easily cutting the main Hungarian army's lines of communication, and even occupy Debrecen, the seat of the Hungarian Revolutionary Parliament and the National Defense Committee (the interim government of Hungary), or alternatively he could encircle the three corps advancing to relieve Komárom.[10]

The region in which the Battle of Nagysalló took place in a map from the middle of the 19th century

Although the president of the National Defense Committee (interim government of Hungary), Lajos Kossuth, who went to the Hungarian headquarters at Gödöllő after the battle of Isaszeg, wanted a direct attack on Pest, he was finally convinced by the Hungarian commander-in-chief, Artúr Görgei that his and the other generals’ plan was better.[11] To help to ensure the Hungarian army's success, the National Defense Committee sent 100 wagonloads of munitions from Debrecen.[12] In the Battle of Vác on 10 April the Hungarian III Corps under General János Damjanich defeated Ramberg's division led by Major General Christian Götz, who was mortally wounded.[13] Even after this battle, the imperial high command under Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz was unsure whether the main Hungarian army had in front of Pest or had already moved north to relieve Komárom. They still believed it was possible that only a secondary force had attacked Vác and moved towards the besieged Hungarian fortress.[14] When Windisch-Grätz finally seemed to grasp what was really happening, he wanted to make a powerful attack against the Hungarians outside Pest on 14 April, then to cross the Danube at Esztergom and cut off the force which was marching towards Komárom. However, his corps commanders, General Franz Schlik and Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić refused to obey his orders, so his plan which could have caused serious problems for the Hungarian armies was never realized.[15]

Windisch-Grätz sent the order to Lieutenant General Ludwig von Wohlgemuth to use the reserve corps formed from available imperial troops from Vienna, Styria, Bohemia and Moravia to stop the Hungarian army's westward advance to Komárom.[16] But by the time this happened, Windisch-Grätz was no longer in Hungary, because in the meantime on 12 April he was relieved of his command by Emperor Franz Joseph I of Austria Feldzeugmeister Ludwig von Welden, the former military governor of Vienna, was designated to replace him but until Welden arrived, Windisch-Grätz had to hand over to Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić as interim commander-in-chief of the imperial armies in Hungary.[17] But this change at the head of the imperial forces brought neither lucidity nor organization to the imperial high command, because the first thing Jelačić did at the start of his appointment was to call off Windisch-Grätz's plan of concentrating the imperial armies around Esztergom, without giving this not unpromising plan a chance.[18]

Görgey, who had installed his headquarters at Vác after the battle from 10 April, ordered Damjanich's III Corps to advance towards Léva on 11 April and Klapka's I Corps to do so on the 12th. Their place in Vác was taken by VII Corps under András Gáspár, then after that followed them, Vác was occupied by Kmety's division.[19]

Prelude

Wohlgemuth and his three brigades neared the Vág and Garam rivers, being joined by a brigade from Lieutenant General Balthasar Simunich's division and the Jablonowski division defeated at Vác some days earlier. Welden was sure, that this Austrian army corps, now containing around 20 000 men, would stop the Hungarian advancement.[20] But the contradictory orders given by Welden and Jelačić prevented the corps from arriving in time in the vicinity of the Garam.[21] On 17 April Welden ordered Jelačić to march towards Vác and link up with Wohlgemuth, but the Croatian ban was reluctant to obey, only agreeing to move on 20 April (a day after the battle of Nagysalló actually took place).[22]

Damjanich János
Ludwig von Wohlgemuth

Meanwhile, on 15–17 April the Hungarian army consisting of I and III Corps and two divisions of VII Corps arrived at the Garam, under Görgei's overall command. He sent a detachment of 2,300 soldiers and 10 guns north under the command of his older brother Ármin Görgei to occupy the so-called Mining Towns (including Selmecbánya, Körmöcbánya, Besztercebánya), and to cover against an attack from the north.[23] Görgei also ordered the three corps to build bridges across the Garam in three separate places. Because I Corps's bridge was finished quickly, while work on the other two was progressing very slowly, on the 18th Görgei ordered that III Corps should also cross on the I Corps bridge at Nagykálna, leaving only VII Corps on the east bank trying to finish its bridge at Zsemlér. Then I and III Corps advanced southwest.[24] On the same day Nagysalló was occupied by Dessewffy's division of I Corps.[25]

Wolgemuth's Austrians were positioned as follows: Veigl's brigade at Bese, Herzinger's at Cseke, Strastil's and Dreyhann's brigades of Jablonowski's division together with Theissing's brigade at Nagymálas, and Perin's at Köbölkút.[26] In a letter to the high command written at midnight on 16 April he reported the Hungarians’ strength as 24,000 men with 48 guns, among them a 12-pounder battery, and that their purpose was to advance towards Komárom. This shows that his reconnaissance had been quite good, giving him fairly accurate knowledge of their strength and intentions.[27] In the same letter he wrote that he hoped they would be slow to cross the river, as he wanted to confront them before they reached Nyitra.[28] Welden replied that he should attack the Hungarians, thinking that this would boost the imperial soldiers’ morale and demoralize the Hungarians.[29] Welden had also heard about the possibility of intervention by the Russian Empire on behalf of the Habsburg Empire to crush the Hungarian War of Independence, and that some of the czar's troops had already entered the Habsburg province of Galicia, in case the Austrian situation became hopeless.[30] But Welden did not want the Austrians to suffer the shame that they could only defeat the Hungarians with Russian help: What we can achieve with our own power is more than the brightest result which we can achieve with foreign help.[31] This was also one of the reasons he was urging Wohlgemuth to do battle with the Hungarians.[32]

Battle

At dawn on 19 April, Wohlgemuth ordered Strastil's brigade to attack Nagysalló, which it accomplished, chasing Klapka's vanguard out of the village.[33] Klapka decided to retake the place, and also informed Damjanich about this.[34]

The Battle of Nagysalló around noon.

The action began at 10 o'clock with a heavy artillery duel, then after an hour of fighting, two divisions of Hungarian I Corps finally forced Strastil to retreat with a bayonet charge.[35] The imperial brigade retreated to the southwest of Nagysalló.[36] Wohlgemuth ordered it to counterattack, also sending Dreyhann's brigade from Nagymálas in support. The two brigades entered the village but were pushed out.[37] Major General Felix Jablonowski ordered them to retreat to the heights southwest of the village.[38]

At this moment the Hungarian right wing was attacked by Herzinger's brigade from Cseke, which swept away the Hungarian Dipold brigade and pushed it back to the Hölvény wood (outside Nagysalló). But here Bobich's brigade stopped them, while the retreating Hungarian brigade also halted and regrouped.[39] Here these two brigades were taken charge of by Major General Richard Guyon (who was not supposed to participate in the battle, because he was designated as the new commander of the besieged troops of Komárom, he just wanted to fight and help his army to obtain victory).[40] Under Guyon's lead, the two Hungarian brigades forced Herzinger to retreat.[41]

The military actions in the Battle of Nagysalló 19.10.1849

Around 3 o'clock the Hungarians began a general attack led by János Damjanich. Seeing his troops’ lack of success, Wohlgemuth was thinking of retreating, but he was waiting for Veigl's and Perin's brigades advancing from Bese and Köbölkút towards Jászfalu, to join his main body. However, at this very moment the cavalry of the Hungarian VII Corps, led by Colonel Ernő Poeltenberg appeared on his right flank.[42] VII Corps had started to cross their bridge over the Garam at Zsemlér as soon as it was ready, at 7 o'clock in the morning. Hearing the gunfire, Gáspár urged his troops to hurry across and join the battle. He ordered them into battle to the left of Nagysalló: the artillery and cavalry to support III Corps, with Poeltenberg's brigade in Nagysalló to observe the road towards Zselíz.[43] Those of his troops who crossed after this also marched towards Nagysalló. Two Hungarian battalions tried to outflank the village from the left, forcing the remaining imperial troops to retreat from it. The Hungarian artillery fired so effectively upon the enemy artillery that this was forced to retreat.[44] The retreating imperial artillery tried to redeploy further back, but after the VII Corps sappers had bridged two ditches for it, the Hungarian artillery advanced and drove the imperial guns away again.[45]

Thus the 4th Sándor Hussar Regiment led by Poeltenberg, together with the cavalry of III Corps under General József Nagysándor, and a horse artillery battery obliterated the imperial cavalry on the right flank.[46][47] The Austrians retreated to Nagymálas, pursued by the Hungarian army.[48] Here the cavalry attacked again, while some of the infantry and a battery outflanked the village from the left, and two half-batteries advanced on the road.[49] At that moment an imperial battalion charged out of the Nagymálas woods, but the Hungarian artillery fire shattered them and drove them into the village.[50] Because the imperial troops gathered in Nagymálas were being bombarded from the front and flanks, they retreated from the village and took position behind it.[51]

Chasing the fleeing imperials at Nagysalló Than

The Hungarian vanguard was being led by Lieutenant-Colonel Lajos Zámbelly, the VII Corps chief of staff who sent two battalions into the woods near the village to attack the flank of the imperials fighting there.[52] Meanwhile, Gáspár commanding the left wing linked up with Zámbelly's units and entered Nagymálas, driving the imperials out and chasing them to Farnad. Here the Hungarian artillery again took the leading role and bombarded the enemy who split into two groups, one fleeing to Jászfalu, the other to the woods around Cseke.[53] Then the larger group was pursued by the III Corps cavalry and the smaller by Zámbelly's troops with three squadrons of Sándor hussars, taking around 1,000 prisoners.[54]

The left wing of the imperial army could not participate in the battle because Wohlgemuth failed to withdraw his troops at the right time.[55] But the four brigades he did bring into action fought very bravely.[56]

Görgey did not lead his troops in the battle, but let his corps commanders operate freely, without his direction.[57] Despite that, this battle demonstrated that the Hungarian army could fight in a perfectly coordinated way, without committing the mistakes of the previous battles when different officers showed varying degrees of initiative when faced with unexpected situations, as for example in the Battle of Isaszeg. In this battle (Nagysalló) Klapka, Damjanich, and Gáspár, three generals with very different temperaments (Damjanich being very impulsive, taking instant decisions in battle and acting on them without regard for the risk; Klapka, an old fashioned Habsburg-type general, who attached great importance to the safety of his troops;[58] and Gáspár, who was sometimes inclined to obey his superiors’ previous orders, even when the situation on the ground demanded that he act differently for the sake of the battle.[59]) showed perfect coordination and the ability to make the right decisions when the situation required, which ensured success for the Hungarian army.[60] The cavalry also excelled in its pursuit of the fleeing enemy at the end of the battle.[61] This is why the Battle of Nagysalló is considered one of the best executed battles of the Hungarian Independence war.[62][63]

Aftermath

The imperial losses were heavy. While Wohlgemuth reported 112 dead, 195 wounded and 1,243 missing, the Hungarian military reports just of Austrian prisoners show no fewer than 1,200 men. The Hungarian VII Corps alone reported capturing 5 officers, 1 chief medical officer and 500 soldiers.[64] Hungarian sources give the imperial losses as 2,000 men. The Hungarian losses were given by György Klapka as 600, and by Richárd Gelich as 700.[65]

Görgey was satisfied with the result of the battle, writing afterwards: The morale of our troops is quite excellent. This victory enthuses and inspires all defenders of the homeland, who endure and suffer all the vicissitudes and hardships of the war, and look to the events of the future with high spirits.[66]

The news about the Hungarian Declaration of Independence from 14 April 1849, arrived to Görgei's camp. Although he was against this step of the Hungarian political leaders, and in the future this caused serious conflicts between him and Lajos Kossuth, right after the battle of Nagysalló, he declared, kind of joking, referring to both these events (the declaration of the Hungarian independence and the battle of Nagysalló): I am sure that when the gentlemen in Debrecen [the political leaders of Hungary, led by Kossuth] hear the news about this victory, they will declare war even to the Tzar of Russia.[67]

This defeat forced Wohlgemuth not to lead his army towards Komárom, where he planned to join the besieging Austrians, but to retreat towards Érsekújvár.[68] Two days after the battle, on 21 April, the first Hungarian units entered Komárom, ending the imperial blockade on the northern side of the fortress.[69] On the 24th Lieutenant General Balthasar von Simunich informed Lieutenant General Anton Csorich that the Hungarians had repaired the bridge across the Danube, and had started to cross the river on it and on rafts. He therefore asked Csorich to bring his troops to Herkálypuszta by the morning of 25 April at the latest, to help him against the Hungarian attack.[70] Next day, on the 26th, the Hungarian troops attacked the besieging imperial army from Komárom, which ended in the Austrian army retreating towards the west, so the main aim of the Spring Campaign – the liberation of the western part of Hungary – was achieved.[71]

The victory of Nagysalló brought about significant results. It opened the way towards Komárom, bringing its relief to within a couple of days.[72] At the same time it left the imperials incapable of spreading their troops out enough to cover the very large front which this Hungarian victory created, so instead of uniting their forces around Pest and Buda, as they planned, Feldzeugmeister Welden had to order the retreat from Pest, as he was in danger of being caught in the Hungarian pincers.[73] When he learned about the defeat, on the morning of 20 April, he wrote to Lieutenant General Balthasar Simunich, the commander of the forces besieging Komárom, and to Prince Felix of Schwarzenberg, the Minister-President of the Austrian Empire, that in order to secure Vienna and Pozsony, against a Hungarian attack he was forced to retreat from Pest and even from Komárom.[74] He also wrote that the morale of the imperial troops was very low, and because of this they could not fight another battle for a while without suffering another defeat.[75] So the next day he ordered the evacuation of Pest, leaving a substantial garrison in the fortress of Buda to defend it against Hungarian attack. He ordered Jelačić to remain in Pest for a while, and then to retreat towards Eszék in Bácska where the Serbian insurgents allied with the Austrians were in a grave situation after the victories of the Hungarian armies led by Mór Perczel and Józef Bem.[76]

Notes
  1. Hermann 2004, pp. 245.
  2. Hermann 2004, pp. 245.
  3. Hermann 2004, pp. 245.
  4. Hermann 2004, pp. 245.
  5. Hermann 2001, pp. 282.
  6. Hermann 2001, pp. 282.
  7. Hermann 2001, pp. 282.
  8. Hermann 2001, pp. 282.
  9. Hermann 2001, pp. 282.
  10. Hermann 2001, pp. 282.
  11. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 282–283.
  12. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 282–283.
  13. Hermann 2004, pp. 233–236.
  14. Hermann 2004, pp. 235.
  15. Hermann 2001, pp. 284.
  16. Hermann 2001, pp. 285.
  17. Hermann 2001, pp. 285.
  18. Hermann 2001, pp. 285.
  19. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 290.
  20. Hermann 2001, pp. 285.
  21. Hermann 2001, pp. 285.
  22. Hermann 2001, pp. 285.
  23. Hermann 2001, pp. 287.
  24. Hermann 2001, pp. 287.
  25. Hermann 2001, pp. 287.
  26. Hermann 2001, pp. 287.
  27. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 293.
  28. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 293.
  29. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 293.
  30. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 293.
  31. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 292.
  32. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 293.
  33. Hermann 2004, pp. 242.
  34. Hermann 2004, pp. 242.
  35. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 294.
  36. Hermann 2004, pp. 242.
  37. Hermann 2004, pp. 242.
  38. Hermann 2004, pp. 242.
  39. Hermann 2004, pp. 242.
  40. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 294.
  41. Hermann 2004, pp. 242.
  42. Hermann 2004, pp. 242.
  43. Hermann 2004, pp. 242.
  44. Hermann 2004, pp. 242.
  45. Hermann 2004, pp. 242–243.
  46. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 294.
  47. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  48. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  49. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  50. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  51. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  52. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  53. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  54. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  55. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 294.
  56. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 294.
  57. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 301.
  58. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 289–290.
  59. Hermann 2004, pp. 226–227.
  60. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 295.
  61. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 295.
  62. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 295.
  63. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  64. Hermann 2001, pp. 289.
  65. Bánlaky József: A magyar nemzet hadtörténete XXI, Magyarország 1848/49. évi függetlenségi harcának katonai története Arcanum Adatbázis Kft. 2001
  66. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  67. Hermann Róbert: Kossuth és Görgei Iskolakultúra 1998/3, pp. 89
  68. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  69. Hermann 2001, pp. 291.
  70. Hermann 2001, pp. 291–292.
  71. Hermann 2001, pp. 294–295.
  72. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  73. Hermann 2004, pp. 243.
  74. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 300–301.
  75. Pusztaszeri 1984, pp. 301.
  76. Hermann 2001, pp. 291.

Sources
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  • Bóna, Gábor (1987). Tábornokok és törzstisztek a szabadságharcban 1848–49 ("Generals and Staff Officers in the War of Freedom 1848–1849") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó. p. 430. ISBN 963-326-343-3.
  • Hermann (ed), Róbert (1996). Az 1848–1849 évi forradalom és szabadságharc története ("The history of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849) (in Hungarian). Budapest: Videopont. p. 464. ISBN 963-8218-20-7.CS1 maint: extra text: authors list (link)
  • Hermann, Róbert (2004). Az 1848–1849-es szabadságharc nagy csatái ("Great battles of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848–1849") (in Hungarian). Budapest: Zrínyi. p. 408. ISBN 963-327-367-6.
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