Cham–Vietnamese War (1471)

The Cham-Đại Việt War of 1471 was a military expedition launched by king Lê Thánh Tông of Đại Việt under the Lê dynasty and is widely regarded as the event that marked the downfall of Champa. The Vietnamese forces attacked and ransacked the kingdom's largest city-state, Vijaya and defeated the Cham army, bringing the kingdom of Champa to an end.[2]

Further information: History of the Cham–Vietnamese wars

Cham–Vietnamese War of 1471
Date1471
Location
Champa, Đại Việt
Result Vietnamese victory
Belligerents
Champa Đại Việt
Commanders and leaders
P'an-Lo T'ou-Ts'iuan (POW)[1] Lê Thánh Tông
Đinh Liệt
Strength
100,000, including elephant corps 100,000
150,000 civilian supports
Casualties and losses
60,000 —

Background

The Cham and the Vietnamese had a long history of conflict. In the course of their wars, peace often coincided with economic exhaustion, with the antagonists rebuilding their economies just to go to war again.[3] When fighting resumed in 1471, the Champa kingdom found itself weakened and isolated. It had experienced numerous civil wars and, at one point, had five different rulers.[4] Because of the Cham's earlier attack on Angkor, the Khmers ignored their request for assistance when Đại Việt invaded.[5] After an expedition to Champa of 1446, Vietnamese efforts to hold the Cham king as a vassal quickly failed and relations between the two kingdoms deteriorated.[6]

The Cham also requested that Ming China intervene and help bring the Vietnamese back in line by force and demarcate the border between Champa and Vietnam. China, however, only verbally rebuked the Vietnamese for its incursion, as the Ming Chinese sought to preserve trade and border security rather than continuing expansions. The Vietnamese ignored the rebuke and proceeded with their plan to destroy their rival.[7]

Campaign

In 1470, a Cham army numbered 100,000 under king Maha Sajan arrived and besieged the Vietnamese garrison at Huế. The local commander sent appeals to Hanoi for help.[8] King Thánh Tông felt angry. Within weeks, soldiers were mobilized, rice was collected and transported south, and envoys hastened to inform Ming of what was planned. Three months later, during the winter season, Thánh Tông published the detailed campaign orders to his generals and proclaiming in a long edict the reasons for the expedition.[6]

On November 28, 1470, 100,000-strong Vietnamese naval expedition led by Đinh Liệt and Lê Niem set out to attack Champa, followed by another 150,000 Vietnamese supplies civilians on December 8. Fighting started on February 24, 1471, when five hundred Vietnamese warships and 30,000 troops were ordered to block the way of 5,000 Cham troops and elephants. Then one thousand warships and 70,000 troops followed under the leadership of Thánh Tông. This came at a massive financial cost, since it drained the Vietnamese treasury of 1,000 gold liang a day.[9] The Vietnamese forces used cannons and bombarded the city, blasting a breach in Vijaya's defenses prior to storming the city.[2] On March 22 the Cham capital Vijaya collapsed after a four-day siege. more than 30,000 Chams were captured, including King Tra Toan and his family members whom were deported to the north, and over 40,000 killed.[10][8]

Aftermath

The balance of power between the Cham and the Vietnamese for more than 500 years came to an end. A Cham general fled and established himself as ruler at modern Phan Rang, more than 250 kilometers further south. He and two others, a ruler in the Central Highlands (the region of Kon Tum and Pleiku) and a ruler on the coast immediately to the south of Bình Định, in the modern provinces of Phú Yên and Khánh Hòa, submitted to Thánh Tông as vassals.[11] Cham representatives told the Ming Empire that Annam destroyed their country. The Chinese Ming Dynasty records evidence the extent of the Vietnamese destruction wrought on Champa. The Vietnamese enslaved several thousand Chams and forced assimilation into Vietnamese culture onto Chams. The number included 50 members of the royal family.[4] The Chams informed the Ming that they continued to fight against the Vietnamese occupation of their land, which had been turned into the 13th province of Đại Việt.[12] The Ming annals recorded that in 1485 that "Champa is a distant and dangerous place, and Annam is still employing troops there."[13]

The Champa kingdom was destroyed by the invasion, leaving a small rump state which lasted until 1832, when emperor Minh Mang initiated the final conquest of the remnants of Champa. The Vietnamese ceramics trade was severely affected due to the impact suffered by the Cham merchants after the invasion.[14] The Ming scholar Wu Pu (吳樸) recommended that to help stop the Vietnamese, Ming should help resuscitate the Champa Kingdom.[15] The Ming dynasty however did not follow his recommendation, due to internal security concerns.

The Ming Empire sent a censor, Ch'en Chun, to Champa in 1474 to install the Champa King, but his entry was blocked by Vietnamese soldiers who had taken over Champa. He proceeded to Malacca instead and its ruler sent back tribute to the Ming dynasty.[16] Malacca sent envoys again in 1481 to inform the Ming that, while going back to Malacca in 1469 from a trip to China, the Vietnamese attacked them, castrating the young and enslaving them. The Malaccans reported that Đại Việt was in control of Champa and sought to conquer Malacca, but the Malaccans did not fight back, due to a lack of permission from the Ming to engage in war. The Ming Emperor scolded them, ordering the Malaccans to strike back with violent force if the Vietnamese attacked.[17][18]

More ethnic Vietnamese had moved south and settled on conquered Cham lands.[19] However while Đại Việt was a much reduced force during the sixteenth century, the Burmese Empire under Tabinshweti and Bayinnaung had become the major force in mainland Southeast Asia, put an end to Vietnamese expansion.[20] Only a small Cham kingdom remained in the south but this did not persist. Around 162,000 Cham remain in Vietnam today.[5]

References
  1. Ray 2007, p. 278.
  2. Purton 2010, p. 202.
  3. Moseley 2007, p. 191-192.
  4. Kohn 1999, p. 521.
  5. Chapuis 1995, p. 46.
  6. Taylor 2013, p. 220.
  7. Wang 1998, p. 318.
  8. Sun 2006, p. 100.
  9. Kiernan 2009, p. 109.
  10. Maspero 2002, p. 117-118.
  11. Taylor 2013, p. 221.
  12. Kiernan 2009, p. 110.
  13. Kiernan 2019, p. 211.
  14. Schottenhammer & Ptak 2006, p. 138.
  15. Yamazaki 2014.
  16. Rost 1887, p. 251.
  17. Rost 1887, p. 252.
  18. Tsai 1996, p. 15.
  19. Hall 1999, p. 268.
  20. Wang 1998, p. 330-331.

Sources
  • Angela Schottenhammer; Roderich Ptak (2006). The Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. ISBN 978-3-447-05340-2.
  • Moseley, Alexander (2007). A Philosophy of War. Algora Publishing. ISBN 0-87586-183-0.
  • Purton, Peter (2010), A History of the Late Medieval Siege 1200–1500, The Boydell Press
  • Kohn, George (1999), Dictionary of Wars, London: Routledge, ISBN 978-1-135-95494-9
  • Chapuis, Oscar (1995). A history of Vietnam: from Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0-313-29622-7.
  • Taylor, K.W. (2013). A History of the Vietnamese. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-87586-8.
  • Coedès, George (2015), The Making of South East Asia (RLE Modern East and South East Asia), Taylor & Francis
  • Maspero, Georges (2002). The Champa Kingdom. White Lotus Co., Ltd. ISBN 978-9-747-53499-3.
  • Rost, Reinhold (1887). Miscellaneous papers relating to Indo-China: reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from Dalrymple's "Oriental Repertory," and the "Asiatic Researches" and "Journal" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Volume 1. LONDON: Trübner & Co.
  • Yamazaki, Takeshi (April 22, 2014). "Tongking Gulf under Reconquest? Maritime Interaction Between China and Vietnam Before and After the Diplomatic Crisis in the Sixteenth Century". Crossroads – Studies on the History of Exchange Relations in the East Asian World. 8: 193–216. Archived from the original on August 24, 2017. Retrieved May 2, 2016 – via www.eacrh.net.
  • Ray, Nick (2007). Lonely Planet Vietnam. Lonely Planet.
  • Sun, Laichen (2006), "Chinese Gunpowder Technology and Đại Việt, ca. 1390–1497", in Reid, Anthony; Tran, Nhung Tuyet (eds.), Viet Nam: Borderless Histories, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 72–120, ISBN 978-1-316-44504-4
  • Twitchett, Denis Crispin; Fairbank, John King (1978). The Cambridge history of China, Volume 2; Volume 8. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-24333-5.
  • Wang, Gungwu (1998), "Ming foreign relations: Southeast Asia", in Twitchett, Denis Crispin; Fairbank, John K. (eds.), The Cambridge History of China: Volume 8, The Ming Dynasty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 301–332
  • Kiernan, Ben (2009). Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-14425-3.
  • Hall, Kenneth (1999), "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia", in Tarling, Nicholas (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume 1, From Early Times to c.1800, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • Tsai, Shih-shan Henry (1996). The eunuchs in the Ming dynasty. SUNY Press. ISBN 0-7914-2687-4.
  •  This article incorporates text from Miscellaneous papers relating to Indo-China: reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from Dalrymple's "Oriental Repertory," and the "Asiatic Researches" and "Journal" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Volume 1, by Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Straits Branch, Reinhold Rost, a publication from 1887, now in the public domain in the United States.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.