Chinese economic reform

The Chinese economic reform (simplified Chinese: 改革开放; traditional Chinese: 改革開放; pinyin: Gǎigé kāifàng; lit. 'reform and opening-up'; known in the West as the Opening of China) was the program of economic reforms termed "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" and "socialist market economy" in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Led by Deng Xiaoping, often credited as the "General Architect", the reforms were launched by reformists within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on December 18, 1978 during the "Boluan Fanzheng" period.[1][2][3][4] The reforms went into stagnation after the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, but were revived after Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour in 1992. In 2010, China overtook Japan as the world's second-largest economy.[5][6]

Main article: Economy of China
History of the People's
Republic of China (PRC)
Mao era
Transition and Deng era
Jiang and the third generation
Hu and the fourth generation
Xi and the fifth generation
History of
Generations of leadership
 China portal

Before the reforms, the Chinese economy was dominated by state ownership and central planning. From 1950 to 1973, Chinese real GDP per capita grew at a rate of 2.9% per year on average, albeit with major fluctuations stemming from the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.[7] This placed it near the middle of the Asian nations during the same period,[8] with neighboring capitalist countries such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore and rival Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China outstripping mainland China's rate of growth.[9] Starting in 1970, the economy entered into a period of stagnation,[10] and after the death of Mao Zedong, the Communist Party leadership turned to market-oriented reforms to salvage the failing economy.[11]

The Communist Party authorities carried out the market reforms in two stages. The first stage, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, involved the de-collectivization of agriculture, the opening up of the country to foreign investment, and permission for entrepreneurs to start businesses. However, a large percentage of industries remained state-owned. The second stage of reform, in the late 1980s and 1990s, involved the privatization and contracting out of much state-owned industry. The 1985 lifting of price controls[12] was a major reform, and protectionist policies and regulations soon followed, although state monopolies in sectors such as banking and petroleum remained. In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). The private sector grew remarkably, accounting for as much as 70 percent of China's gross domestic product by 2005.[13] From 1978 until 2013, unprecedented growth occurred, with the economy increasing by 9.5% a year. The conservative Hu Jintao's administration regulated and controlled the economy more heavily after 2005, reversing some reforms.[14] On the other hand, a parallel set of political reforms were launched by Deng in 1980, but eventually ended in 1989 due to the Tiananmen Square protests.

The success of China's economic policies and the manner of their implementation resulted in immense changes in Chinese society in the last 40 years, including greatly decreased poverty while both average incomes and income inequality have increased, leading to a backlash led by the New Left. In the academic scene, scholars have debated the reason for the success of the Chinese "dual-track" economy, and have compared it to attempts to reform socialism in the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union; as well as to the growth of other developing economies. Additionally, these series of reforms have led to China's rise as a world power and a shift of international geopolitical interests in favour of it over Taiwan.

The reform era has been said to end during the leadership of Xi Jinping,[15][16][17] who generally opposes the reforms and has rolled back many of the Deng-era reforms[18][19][20] as the Communist Party reasserts control over different aspects of Chinese society, including the economy.[7][21] In 2018, sinologist Minxin Pei argued that the Chinese economy is currently the least open since the reform era began in the 1980s.[22] This de-liberalization is seen by one Hong Kong commentator as part of the subject of the present US–China trade war,[21] in which the United States alleges the Chinese government is giving unfair and discriminatory competitive advantages to Chinese state-owned and private companies.[23][24]

Course of reforms

Origin

In September 1976, Mao Zedong died, and in October, Hua Guofeng together with Ye Jianying and Wang Dongxing arrested the Gang of Four, putting an end to the Cultural Revolution.[25] (The words "principles laid down" were themselves supposedly a quotation from Mao, but their canonical status was in dispute.) Urban militia units commanded by supporters of the radical group were placed on a heightened state of readiness.[26][25]

Economic reforms began during the "Boluan Fanzheng" period, especially after Deng Xiaoping and his reformist allies rose to power with Deng replacing Hua Guofeng as the paramount leader of China in December 1978. By the time Deng took power, there was widespread support among the elite for economic reforms. As the de facto leader, Deng's policies faced opposition from party conservatives but were extremely successful in increasing the country's wealth.[27]

1979–1984
See also: History of the People's Republic of China § Political reforms
The image of Deng Xiaoping in Shenzhen, Guangdong, one of the first special economic zones approved by Deng in 1979.

In 1979, Deng Xiaoping emphasized the goal of "Four Modernizations" and further proposed the idea of "xiaokang", or "moderately prosperous society".[28][29][30] The achievements of Lee Kuan Yew to create an economic superpower in Singapore had a profound effect on the Communist leadership in China. Leaders in China made a major effort, especially under Deng Xiaoping, to emulate his policies of economic growth, entrepreneurship, and subtle suppression of dissent. Over the years, more than 22,000 Chinese officials were sent to Singapore to study its methods.[31]

Deng's first reforms began in agriculture, a sector long mismanaged by the Chinese Communist Party. By the late 1970s, food supplies and production had become so deficient that government officials were warning that China was about to repeat the "disaster of 1959", the famines which killed tens of millions during the Great Leap Forward.[32] Deng responded by decollectivizing agriculture and emphasizing the household-responsibility system, which divided the land of the People's communes into private plots. Under the new policy, peasants were able to exercise formal control of their land as long as they sold a contracted portion of their crops to the government.[33] This move increased agricultural production by 25 percent between 1975 and 1985, setting a precedent for privatizing other parts of the economy.[33] The bottom-up approach of the reforms promoted by Deng, in contrast to the top-down approach of the Perestroika in the Soviet Union, is considered an important factor contributing to the success of China's economic transition.[34]

Reforms were also implemented in urban industry to increase productivity. A dual-price system was introduced, in which (State-owned enterprise reform 1979) state-owned industries were allowed to sell any production above the plan quota, and commodities were sold at both plan and market prices, allowing citizens to avoid the shortages of the Maoist era. Moreover, the adoption of Industrial Responsibility System 1980s further promote the development of state-owned enterprise by allowing individuals or groups to manage the enterprise by contract. Private businesses were allowed to operate for the first time since the Communist takeover, and they gradually began to make up a greater percentage of industrial output.[35] Price flexibility was also increased, expanding the service sector.[36]

At the same time, in December 1978, Deng announced a new policy, the Open Door Policy, to open the door to foreign businesses that wanted to set up in China.[37][38] For the first time since the Kuomintang era, the country was opened to foreign investment. Deng created a series of Special Economic Zones, including Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Xiamen, for foreign investment that were relatively free of the bureaucratic regulations and interventions that hampered economic growth. These regions became engines of growth for the national economy.[36] On January 31, 1979, the Shekou Industrial Zone of Shenzhen was founded, becoming the first experimental area in China to "open up".[39][40] Under the leadership of Yuan Geng, the "Shekou model" of development was gradually formed, embodied in its famous slogan Time is Money, Efficiency is Life, which then widely spread to other parts of China.[39][41] In January 1984, Deng Xiaoping made his first inspection tour to Shenzhen and Zhuhai, praising the "Shenzhen Speed" of development as well as the success of the special economics zones.[42][43]

Hu Yaobang, then General Secretary of CCP, played an important role in implementing the reforms together with Zhao Ziyang, then Premier of China.

Besides Deng Xiaoping himself, important high-ranking reformists who helped carry out the reforms include Hu Yaobang, then General Secretary of Chinese Communist Party, and Zhao Ziyang, then Premier of the People's Republic of China.[44][45] Other leaders who favored Deng's reforms include Xi Zhongxun (the father of Xi Jinping), Wan Li, Hu Qili and others.[46][47][48] Another influential leader was Chen Yun, regarded by some as the second most powerful person in China after Deng with more conservative ideology of the reforms.[49][50][51] Though Deng Xiaoping is credited as the architect of modern China's economic reforms, Chen was more directly involved in the details of its planning and construction, and led a force that opposed many of the reforms from Deng's side.[50][52] The two sides struggled over the general direction of the reforms until Chen died in 1995.[50][51][52] A key feature of Chen's ideas was to use the market to allocate resources, within the scope of an overall plan. Some reforms of the early 1980s were, in effect, the implementation of a program that Chen had outlined in the mid-1950s. Chen called this the "birdcage economy (鸟笼经济/鳥籠經濟)".[53][54] According to Chen, "the cage is the plan, and it may be large or small. But within the cage the bird [the economy] is free to fly as he wishes."[50][54] Chen and some other conservative leaders including Li Xiannian never visited Shenzhen, the leading special economic zone championed by Deng.[54]

1984–1993
See also: 1986 Chinese student demonstrations, 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, and Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour
Shenzhen, one of the first special economic zones of China and the "Silicon Valley of China".[55][56] Notable high-tech companies such as Huawei, ZTE and Konka were all founded in Shenzhen in the 1980s.

During this period, Deng Xiaoping's policies continued beyond the initial reforms. Controls on private businesses and government intervention continued to decrease, notably in the agrifood sector which saw relaxation of price controls in 1985,[12] and there was small-scale privatization of state enterprises which had become unviable. A notable development was the decentralization of state control, leaving local provincial leaders to experiment with ways to increase economic growth and privatize the state sector.[57] Township and village enterprises, firms nominally owned by local governments but effectively private, began to gain market share at the expense of the state sector.[58] With the help of Yuan Geng, the first joint-stock commercial bank in China, the China Merchants Bank, and the first joint-stock insurance company in China, the Ping An Insurance, were both established in Shekou. In May 1984, fourteen coastal cities in China including Shanghai, Guangzhou and Tianjin were named "Open Coastal Cities (沿海开放城市)".

The slogan "Time is money, Efficiency is life" from Shekou, Shenzhen, representing the "Shenzhen speed".

On the other hand, the conservative elders led by Chen Yun called to strike a balance between too much laissez-faire market economy and retaining state control over key areas of the economy. Chen Yun helped preserve the economy by preventing policies that would have damaged the interests of special interest groups in the government bureaucracy.[59] Corruption and increased inflation increased discontent, contributing to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 and a conservative backlash after that event which ousted several key reformers and threatened to reverse many of Deng's reforms.[60] However, Deng stood by his reforms and in 1992, he affirmed the need to continue reforms in his southern tour.[59] He also reopened the Shanghai Stock Exchange in November 1990 which was closed by Mao 40 years earlier, while the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was founded in December 1990.

Although the economy grew quickly during this period, economic troubles in the inefficient state sector increased. Heavy losses had to be made up by state revenues and acted as a drain upon the economy.[61] Inflation became problematic in 1985, 1988 and 1992.[60] Privatizations began to accelerate after 1992, and the private sector grew as a percentage of GDP. China's government slowly expanded recognition of the private economy, first as a "complement" to the state sector (1988) and then as an "important component" (1999) of the socialist market economy.[62]

1993–2005
The Lujiazui financial district of Pudong, Shanghai, the financial and commercial hub of modern China

In the 1990s, Deng allowed many radical reforms to be carried out. In the beginning, Chen supported Deng, carried out and implemented many of the influential reforms that made a generation of Chinese richer. But later, Chen realized that the state still needed an active iron hand involvement in the market to prevent the private sector from becoming untamable. Chen's criticism of Deng's later economic reforms was widely influential within the Communist Party and was reflected in the policies of China's leaders after Deng. Chen's theories supported the efforts of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to use state power to provide boundaries for the operation of the market, and to mediate the damage that capitalism can do to those who find it difficult to benefit from the free market. Chen's notion of the CPC as a "ruling party" was central to the redefinition of the role of the Party in Jiang Zemin's Three Represents. In 2005, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of Chen's birth, the Party press published, over the course of several weeks, the proceedings of a symposium discussing Chen's contributions to CCP history, theory and practice.[59]

Although Deng died in 1997, reforms continued under his handpicked successors, Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, who were ardent reformers who also abided by Chen Yun advice to keep the reforms steady and keep the state still in charge of key areas. In 1997 and 1998, large-scale privatization occurred, in which all state enterprises, except a few large monopolies, were liquidated and their assets sold to private investors. Between 2001 and 2004, the number of state-owned enterprises decreased by 48 percent.[58] During the same period, Jiang and Zhu also reduced tariffs, trade barriers, and regulations; reformed the banking system; dismantled much of the Mao-era social welfare system; forced the Chinese army (PLA) to divest itself of military-run businesses;[63] reduced inflation; and joined the World Trade Organization. These moves invoked discontent among some groups, especially laid-off workers of state enterprises that had been privatized.[64]

The domestic private sector first exceeded 50% of GDP in 2005 and has further expanded since. Also in 2005, China was able to surpass Japan as the largest economy in Asia.[65] However, some state monopolies still remained, such as in petroleum and banking.[66]

2005–2012

Hu Jintao and his conservative administration began to reverse some of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 2005. Observers note that the government adopted more egalitarian and populist policies.[67] It increased subsidies and control over the health care sector,[68] halted privatization,[14] and adopted a loose monetary policy, which led to the formation of a U.S.-style property bubble in which property prices tripled.[69] The privileged state sector was the primary recipient of government investment, which under the new administration, promoted the rise of large "national champions" which could compete with large foreign corporations.[14] China would finally surpass Japan's economy in 2010.[70]

2012–present

Under Party general secretary Xi Jinping and his administration, the CCP has sought numerous reforms. Some of these had increased control over state-owned and private enterprises, at least 288 firms have revised their corporate charters to allow the Communist Party greater influence in corporate management, and to reflect the party line.[18] This trend also includes Hong Kong listed firms, who have traditionally downplayed their party links, but are now "redrafting bylaws to formally establish party committees that previously existed only at the group level."[71] In other dimensions, according to Ray Dalio, the Xi era has also been marked by economic opening, greater market-oriented decision-making and discontinuation of support for poorly-managed state-owned enterprises. [72]

On 21 July 2020, the general secretary of China Communist Party, Xin Jinping made a speech to a group of public and private business leaders at the entrepreneur forum in Beijing. Xi emphasized that “We must gradually form a new development pattern with the domestic internal circulation as the main body and the domestic and international dual circulations mutually promoting each other.” [73] Since then “internal circulation” became a hot word in China. Some Chinese worry that the emphasis of “internal circulation” signals returning to 1960s-era seclusion, and ending of Chinese economic reform.[71]

In September 2020, the CCP announced that it would strengthen United Front work in the private sector by establishing more party committees in the regional federations of industry and commerce (FIC), and by arranging a special liaison between FIC and the CCP.[74]

The Xi Jinping era had considerably different economic objectives, in line with two campaigns, Made in China 2025 and China Standards 2035 which sought to scale up and displace US dominance in various high-tech sectors. [72] This is alongside more aggressive pursuit of trade policies, in line with an outlook that sees China move towards taking a more active role in writing the rules of trade.

Effects of the reforms

Economic performance
China's nominal GDP trend from 1952 to 2015. Note the rapid increase since reform in the late 1970s.

After three decades of reform, China's economy experienced one of the world's biggest booms. Agriculture and light industry have largely been privatized, while the state still retains control over some heavy industries. Despite the dominance of state ownership in finance, telecommunications, petroleum and other important sectors of the economy, private entrepreneurs continue to expand into sectors formerly reserved for public enterprise. Prices have also been liberalized.[75]

China's economic growth since the reform has been very rapid, exceeding the East Asian Tigers. Since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's reforms, China's GDP has risen tenfold.[76] The increase in total factor productivity (TFP) was the most important factor, with productivity accounting for 40.1% of the GDP increase, compared with a decline of 13.2% for the period 1957 to 1978—the height of Maoist policies. For the period 1978–2005, Chinese GDP per capita increased from 2.7% to 15.7% of U.S. GDP per capita, and from 53.7% to 188.5% of Indian GDP per capita. Per capita incomes grew at 6.6% a year.[77] Average wages rose sixfold between 1978 and 2005,[78] while absolute poverty declined from 41% of the population to 5% from 1978 to 2001.[79] Some scholars believed that China's economic growth has been understated, due to large sectors of the economy not being counted.[80]

Impact on world growth

China is widely seen as an engine of world and regional growth.[81] Surges in Chinese demand account for 50, 44 and 66 percent of export growth of the Hong Kong SAR of China, Japan and Taiwan respectively, and China's trade deficit with the rest of East Asia helped to revive the economies of Japan and Southeast Asia.[81] Asian leaders view China's economic growth as an "engine of growth for all Asia".[82]

Effect on inequality
Gini-coefficient of national income distribution around the world (dark green: <0.25, red: >0.60)

The economic reforms have increased inequality dramatically within China. Despite rapid economic growth which has virtually eliminated poverty in urban China and reduced it greatly in rural regions and the fact that living standards for everyone in China have drastically increased in comparison to the pre-reform era, the Gini coefficient of China is estimated to be above 0.45, comparable to some Latin American countries and the United States.[83]

Increased inequality is attributed to the disappearance of the welfare state and differences between coastal and interior provinces, the latter being burdened by a larger state sector.[84] Some Western scholars have suggested that reviving the welfare state and instituting a re-distributive income tax system is needed to relieve inequality,[85] while some Chinese economists have suggested that privatizing state monopolies and distributing the proceeds to the population can reduce inequality.[86]

Reforms in specific sectors

Agriculture
Production of wheat from 1961 to 2004. Data from FAO, year 2005. Y-axis: Production in metric ton.

During the pre-reform period, Chinese agricultural performance was extremely poor and food shortages were common.[87] After Deng Xiaoping implemented the household responsibility system, agricultural output increased by 8.2% a year, compared with 2.7% in the pre-reform period, despite a decrease in the area of land used.[87] Food prices fell nearly 50%, while agricultural incomes rose.[88]

A more fundamental transformation was the economy's growing adoption of cash crops instead of just growing rice and grain.[88] Vegetable and meat production increased to the point that Chinese agricultural production was adding the equivalent of California's vegetable industry every two years. Growth in the sector slowed after 1984, with agriculture falling from 40% of GDP to 16%; however, increases in agricultural productivity allowed workers to be released for work in industry and services, while simultaneously increasing agricultural production.[89] Trade in agriculture was also liberalized and China became an exporter of food, a great contrast to its previous famines and shortages.[90]

Industry

In the pre-reform period, industry was largely stagnant and the socialist system presented few incentives for improvements in quality and productivity. With the introduction of the dual-price system and greater autonomy for enterprise managers, productivity increased greatly in the early 1980s.[91] Foreign enterprises and newly formed Township and Village Enterprises, owned by local government and often de facto private firms, competed successfully with state-owned enterprises. By the 1990s, large-scale privatizations reduced the market share of both the Township and Village Enterprises and state-owned enterprises and increased the private sector's market share. The state sector's share of industrial output dropped from 81% in 1980 to 15% in 2005.[92] Foreign capital controls much of Chinese industry and plays an important role.[58]

From virtually an industrial backwater in 1978, China is now the world's biggest producer of concrete, steel, ships and textiles, and has the world's largest automobile market. Chinese steel output quadrupled between 1980 and 2000, and from 2000 to 2006 rose from 128.5 million tons to 418.8 million tons, one-third of global production.[93] Labor productivity at some Chinese steel firms exceeds Western productivity.[93] From 1975 to 1992, China's automobile production rose from 139,800 to 1.1 million, rising to 9.35 million in 2008.[94] Light industries such as textiles saw an even greater increase, due to reduced government interference. Chinese textile exports increased from 4.6% of world exports in 1980 to 24.1% in 2005. Textile output increased 18-fold over the same period.[95]

This increase in production is largely the result of the removal of barriers to entry and increased competition; the number of industrial firms rose from 377,300 in 1980 to nearly 8 million in 1990 and 1996; the 2004 economic census, which excluded enterprises with annual sales below RMB 5 million, counted 1.33 million manufacturing firms, with Jiangsu and Zhejiang reporting more firms than the nationwide total for 1980.[96] Compared to other East Asian industrial growth spurts, China's industrial performance exceeded Japan's but remained behind South Korea and Taiwan's economies.[97]

Trade and foreign investment
Global distribution of Chinese exports in 2006 as a percentage of the top market

Some scholars assert that China has maintained a high degree of openness that is unusual among the other large and populous nations, with competition from foreign goods in almost every sector of the economy. Foreign investment helped to greatly increase quality, knowledge and standards, especially in heavy industry. China's experience supports the assertion that globalization greatly increases wealth for poor countries.[96] Throughout the reform period, the government reduced tariffs and other trade barriers, with the overall tariff rate falling from 56% to 15%. By 2001, less than 40% of imports were subject to tariffs and only 9 percent of import were subject to licensing and import quotas. Even during the early reform era, protectionist policies were often circumvented by smuggling.[98] When China joined the WTO, it agreed to considerably harsher conditions than other developing countries.[99] Trade has increased from under 10% of GDP to 64% of GDP over the same period.[100] China is considered the most open large country; by 2005, China's average statutory tariff on industrial products was 8.9%. The average was 30.9% for Argentina, 27.0% for Brazil, 32.4% for India, and 36.9% for Indonesia.[101]

China's trade surplus is considered by some in the United States as threatening American jobs. In the 2000s, the Bush administration pursued protectionist policies such as tariffs and quotas to limit the import of Chinese goods. Some scholars argue that China's growing trade surplus is the result of industries in more developed Asian countries moving to China, and not a new phenomenon.[82] China's trade policy, which allows producers to avoid paying the Value Added Tax (VAT) for exports and undervaluation of the currency since 2002, has resulted in an overdeveloped export sector and distortion of the economy overall, a result that could hamper future growth.[102]

Foreign investment was also liberalized upon Deng's ascension. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were created in the early 1980s to attract foreign capital by exempting them from taxes and regulations. This experiment was successful and SEZs were expanded to cover the whole Chinese coast. Although FDI fell briefly after the 1989 student protests, it increased again to 160 billion by 2004.[103]

Services
Shanghai Stock Exchange
Shenzhen Stock Exchange

In the 1990s, the financial sector was liberalized.[104] After China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the service sector was considerably liberalized and foreign investment was allowed; restrictions on retail, wholesale and distribution ended.[105] Banking, financial services, insurance and telecommunications were also opened up to foreign investment.[106]

China's banking sector is dominated by four large state-owned banks, which are largely inefficient and monopolistic.[107] China's largest bank, ICBC, is the largest bank in the world. The financial sector is widely seen as a drag on the economy due to the inefficient state management.[108] Non-performing loans, mostly made to local governments and unprofitable state-owned enterprises for political purposes,[109] especially the political goal of keeping unemployment low, are a big drain on the financial system and economy, reaching over 22% of GDP by 2000, with a drop to 6.3% by 2006 due to government recapitalization of these banks. In 2006, the total amount of non-performing loans was estimated at $160 billion.[110] Observers recommend privatization of the banking system to solve this problem, a move that was partially carried out when the four banks were floated on the stock market.[111] China's financial markets, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, are relatively ineffective at raising capital, as they comprise only 11% of GDP.[112]

Due to the weakness of the banks, firms raise most of their capital through an informal, nonstandard financial sector developed during the 1980s and 1990s, consisting largely of underground businesses and private banks.[113] Internal finance is the most important method successful firms use to fund their activities.[113]

By the 1980s much emphasis was placed on the role of advertising in meeting the modernization goals being promoted by Deng. Lip service was still paid to old Maoist ideals of egalitarianism, but it did not inhibit the growth of consumerism.[114]

Government finances

In the pre-reform era, government was funded by profits from state-owned enterprises, much like the Soviet Union.[115] As the state sector fell in importance and profitability, government revenues, especially that of the central government in Beijing, fell substantially and the government relied on a confused system of inventory taxes. Government revenues fell from 35% of GDP to 11% of GDP in the mid-1990s, excluding revenue from state-owned enterprises, with the central government's budget at just 3% of GDP.[116] The tax system was reformed in 1994 when inventory taxes were unified into a single VAT of 17% on all manufacturing, repair, and assembly activities and an excise tax on 11 items, with the VAT becoming the main income source, accounting for half of government revenue. The 1994 reform also increased the central government's share of revenues, increasing it to 9% of GDP.[117]

Academic studies

Reasons for success
See also: Foreign aid to China and China model
Discussion of "China's Next Global Agenda" during the World Economic Forum (2013).

Scholars have proposed a number of theories to explain China's successful transition from a planned to a socialist market economy. This occurred despite unfavorable factors such as the troublesome legacies of socialism, considerable erosion of the work ethic, decades of anti-market propaganda, and the "lost generation" whose education disintegrated amid the disruption of the Cultural Revolution.[118]

One notable theory is that decentralization of state authority allowed local leaders to experiment with various ways to privatize the state sector and energize the economy.[57] Although Deng was not the originator of many of the reforms, he approved them. Another theory focuses on internal incentives within the Chinese government, in which officials presiding over areas of high economic growth were more likely to be promoted. This made local and provincial governments "hungry for investment," who competed to reduce regulations and barriers to investment to boost both economic growth and their careers. Such reforms were possible because Deng cultivated pro-market followers in the government.[119] Herman Kahn argued that Confucian ethic was playing a "similar but more spectacular role in the modernization of East Asia than the Protestant ethic played in Europe".[120]

Taken together, Yuen Yuen Ang argues in Foreign Affairs that political reforms took place with economic reforms under Deng, except the former did not take Western forms. She writes, "To be sure, Deng's reforms emphasized brute capital accumulation rather than holistic development, which led to environmental degradation, inequality, and other social problems. Still they undoubtedly kicked China's growth machine into gear by making the bureaucracy results oriented, fiercely competitive, and responsive to business needs, qualities that are normally associated with democracies." But this only applies to the Deng era. Ang notes that since 2012, when Xi Jinping took over, the new leader has reversed Deng's political reforms and limits to power, "just as political freedoms have become imperative for continued economic growth." [121]

Roberto Azevêdo, Director-General of WTO, met with China’s Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng in Qingdao (2014).

China's success is also due to the export-led growth strategy used successfully by the Four Asian Tigers beginning with Japan in the 1960s–1970s and other newly industrialized countries.[122] In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).[123] As of 2006, over 400 of the Fortune 500 companies had entered the Chinese market, while at the same time a considerable number of Chinese companies had opened their markets outside of China.[124] Foreign aids to China, including those from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, also played an important role.[125][126][127] Since the beginning of opening, China has received a significant amount of aid from major developed countries such as the United States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom.[125][126] For instance, through its Official Development Assistance (ODA), Japan had offered China various forms of assistance worth 3.65 trillion Yen as of 2018.[125][128] On the other hand, the assistance from the U.S. reached a total of US$556 million as of 2012, and has "helped Tibetan communities improve livelihoods, promote sustainable development and environmental conservation, and preserve cultural traditions...also supports targeted programs that strengthen cooperation on combatting the spread of HIV/AIDS and other pandemic and emerging diseases as well as rule of law programs."[125][127]

The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and centrally planned economies in 1989 provided renewed impetus for China to further reform its economy through different policies in order to avoid a similar fate.[129] China also wanted to avoid the Russian ad-hoc experiments with market capitalism under Boris Yeltsin resulting in the rise of powerful oligarchs, corruption, and the loss of state revenue which exacerbated economic disparity.[130]

Comparison to other developing economies
Development trends of Chinese and Indian GDP (1950–2010)

China's transition from a planned economy to a socialist market economy has often been compared with economies in Eastern Europe that are undergoing a similar transition. China's performance has been praised for avoiding the major shocks and inflation that plagued the Eastern Bloc.[131] The Eastern bloc economies saw declines of 13% to 65% in GDP at the beginning of reforms, while Chinese growth has been very strong since the beginning of reform.[132] China also managed to avoid the hyperinflation of 200 to 1,000% that Eastern Europe experienced.[133] This success is attributed to the gradualist and decentralized approach of the Chinese government, which allowed market institutions to develop to the point where they could replace state planning. This contrasts with the "big bang" approach of Eastern Europe, where the state-owned sector was rapidly privatized with employee buyouts, but retained much of the earlier, inefficient management.[134] Other factors thought to account for the differences are the greater urbanization of the CIS economies and differences in social welfare and other institutions.[135] Another argument is that, in the Eastern European economies, political change is sometimes seen to have made gradualist reforms impossible, so the shocks and inflation were unavoidable.[136]

China's economic growth has been compared with other developing countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, and India. GDP growth in China outstrips all other developing countries, with only India after 1990 coming close to China's experience.[137] Scholars believe that high rates of investments, especially increases in capital invested per worker, have contributed to China's superior economic performance.[137] China's relatively free economy, with less government intervention and regulation, is cited by scholars as an important factor in China's superior performance compared to other developing countries.[138]

Legacy and criticism

The government retains monopolies in several sectors, such as petroleum and banking. The recent reversal of some reforms have left some observers dubbing 2008 the "third anniversary of the end of reforms".[14] Nevertheless, observers believe that China's economy can continue growing at rates of 6–8 percent until 2025,[139] though a reduction in state intervention is considered by some to be necessary for sustained growth.[140]

Despite reducing poverty and increasing China's wealth, Deng's reforms have been criticized by the Chinese New Left for increasing inequality and allowing private entrepreneurs to purchase state assets at reduced prices. These accusations were especially intense during the Lang-Gu dispute, in which New Left academic Larry Lang accused entrepreneur Gu Sujung of usurping state assets, after which Gu was imprisoned.[141] The Hu-Wen Administration adopted some New Left policies, such as halting privatizations and increasing the state sector's importance in the economy, and Keynesian policies that have been criticized by some Chinese economists who advocate a policy of deregulation, tax cuts and privatization.[86]

Other criticisms focus on the effects of rapid industrialization on public health and the environment. However, scholars believe that public health issues are unlikely to become major obstacles to the growth of China's economy during the coming decades, and studies have shown that air quality and other environmental measures in China are better than those in developed countries, such as the United States and Japan, at the same level of development.[142]

See also

References

Citations
  1. Faison, Seth (1997-02-20). "DENG XIAOPING IS DEAD AT 92; ARCHITECT OF MODERN CHINA (Published 1997)". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  2. Eisenman, Joshua. "Analysis | What we really know about China's Reform and Opening Up". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  3. Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (2011).
  4. "关于"总设计师"称谓提法的来龙去脉--邓小平纪念网". Renmin Wang (in Chinese). 2016-06-30. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  5. Barboza, David (2010-08-15). "China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2020-05-03.
  6. Press, Associated (2010-08-16). "China overtakes Japan as world's second-largest economy". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 2020-05-03.
  7. Naughton, Barry (2007). The Chinese economy : transitions and growth. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. pp. 3–5. ISBN 978-0262640640. OCLC 70839809.
  8. Walder 2015, pp. 321.
  9. Brandt 2008, p. 8.
  10. Walder 2015, pp. 322.
  11. Brandt 2008, pp. 7–8.
  12. Longworth, John William; Brown, Colin G.; Waldron, Scott A. (2001). Beef in China: Agribusiness Opportunities and Challenges. University of Queensland Press. p. 248. ISBN 9780702232312.
  13. Engardio, Peter (21 August 2005). "China Is a Private-Sector Economy". Bloomberg Businessweek. Archived from the original on 29 January 2014. Retrieved 30 September 2014.
  14. Scissors, Derek (May–June 2009). "Deng Undone: The Costs of Halting Market Reform in China". Foreign Affairs. 88 (3). Archived from the original on 2015-04-21. Retrieved 2014-09-30.
  15. Youwei (2019-06-04). "The End of Reform in China". Foreign Affairs : America and the World. ISSN 0015-7120. Archived from the original on 2019-08-19. Retrieved 2019-08-19.
  16. Tiezzi, Shannon (2018-04-04). "Carl Minzner on China's Post-Reform Era". The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 2019-08-19. Retrieved 2019-08-19.
  17. "China: Deng Xiaoping era ends with start of Xi era". EJ Insight. 2018-09-06. Archived from the original on 2019-08-19. Retrieved 2019-08-19.
  18. "Chinese enterprises write Communist Party's role into charters - Nikkei Asian Review". asia.nikkei.com. Archived from the original on 2017-08-18. Retrieved 2017-08-18.
  19. "Subscribe to read". Financial Times. Archived from the original on 2019-08-23. Retrieved 2019-08-23. Cite uses generic title (help)
  20. "Chinese state tightens grip 40 years after Deng's reforms". Nikkei Asian Review. Archived from the original on 2019-08-24. Retrieved 2019-08-23.
  21. Westcott, Ben; Lee, Lily (December 17, 2018). "China sparked an economic miracle — now there's a fight over its legacy". CNN International Edition. Archived from the original on January 2, 2019. Retrieved January 2, 2019.
  22. Frum, David (2018-03-05). "China Is Not a Garden-Variety Dictatorship". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 2019-08-23. Retrieved 2019-08-23.
  23. Denmark, Ryan Hass and Abraham (2020-08-07). "More pain than gain: How the US-China trade war hurt America". Brookings. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  24. "Why China's subsidised SOEs anger US, Europe – and its own private firms". South China Morning Post. 2019-02-21. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  25. Baum, Richard (1996), Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping, Princeton University Press, p. 40, ISBN 0-69103-637-3
  26. Hsü, Immanuel Chung-yueh (1990), China Without Mao: the Search for a New Order, Oxford University Press, p. 13, ISBN 0-19536-303-5
  27. Vogel, Ezra F. (26 September 2011). "Glossary" (PDF). Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674055445. LCCN 2011006925. OCLC 756365975. OL 24827222M.
  28. "Meet "moderately prosperous" China". Economist. Retrieved 2020-05-26.
  29. "Commentary: Sprinting toward a moderately prosperous society". Xinhuanet. 2019-03-04. Retrieved 2020-05-26.
  30. Wong, John (1998-03-01). "Xiao‐kang: Deng Xiaoping's socio‐economic development target for China". Journal of Contemporary China. 7 (17): 141–152. doi:10.1080/10670569808724309. ISSN 1067-0564.
  31. Chris Buckley, "In Lee Kuan Yew, China Saw a Leader to Emulate," New York Times March 23, 2015
  32. Brandt 2008, p. 8
  33. H., Hunt, Michael (2015-06-26). The world transformed : 1945 to the present. p. 355. ISBN 9780199371020. OCLC 907585907.
  34. Cited by Susan L. Shirk in The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993. ISBN 0-520-07706-7
  35. Brandt 2008, p. 10
  36. Brandt 2008, p. 11
  37. "Open Door Policy". BBC. Archived from the original on 2017-07-25. Retrieved 2019-05-17.
  38. Yun-Wing Sung (16 January 1992). The China-Hong Kong Connection: The Key to China's Open Door Policy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521382458.CS1 maint: uses authors parameter (link)
  39. "Unsung hero of China's opening up is star of Shenzhen museum". South China Morning Post. 2018-12-27. Retrieved 2020-09-05.
  40. "Shekou Industrial Zone — firsts in reform and opening-up". China Daily. Retrieved 2020-09-05.
  41. Cheong, Danson (2018-12-07). "Shenzhen - from village to city of opportunities". The Straits Times. Retrieved 2020-09-05.
  42. "Jan 24-29,1984: Deng Xiaoping visits Shenzhen and Zhuhai - China - Chinadaily.com.cn". www.chinadaily.com.cn. Retrieved 2020-06-17.
  43. Yuan, Yiming (2017-03-15). Studies on China's Special Economic Zones. Springer. ISBN 978-981-10-3704-7.
  44. "Hu Yaobang: an icon of China's reform – and of how little has changed". South China Morning Post. 2019-04-14. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  45. "Zhao Ziyang: The forgotten architect of China's economic reforms | DW | 14.01.2015". Deutsche Welle. 2015-01-14. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  46. Hornby, Lucy (2018-11-15). "Xi versus Deng, the family feud over China's reforms". Financial Times. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  47. "Chinese reform politician Wan Li dies at 98". AP NEWS. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  48. "Hu Qili Urged People Throughout Country to Help Change China With AM-China, Bjt". AP NEWS. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  49. Bachman, David (1986). "Differing Visions of China's Post-Mao Economy: The Ideas of Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhao Ziyang". Asian Survey. 26 (3): 292–321. doi:10.2307/2644194. ISSN 0004-4687.
  50. Wudunn, Sheryl (1995-04-11). "Chen Yun, a Chinese Communist Patriarch Who Helped Slow Reforms, Is Dead at 89 (Published 1995)". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  51. "CHEN YUN DIES". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2021-01-12.
  52. Sullivan, Lawrence R. (1988). "Assault on the Reforms: Conservative Criticism of Political and Economic Liberalization in China, 1985-86". The China Quarterly (114): 198–222. ISSN 0305-7410.
  53. Exupoli. "Bird Cage Economics". Exupoli.net.
  54. Coase, Ronald; Wang, Ning (2012), Coase, Ronald; Wang, Ning (eds.), "A Bird in the Cage: Market Reform under Socialism", How China Became Capitalist, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 68–103, doi:10.1057/9781137019370_4, ISBN 978-1-137-01937-0, retrieved 2021-01-12
  55. The rise of China's 'Silicon Valley' - CNN Video, retrieved 2020-05-25
  56. "Xinhua Headlines: The rise of China's Silicon Valley - Xinhua | English.news.cn". www.xinhuanet.com. Retrieved 2020-05-25.
  57. Brandt 2008, pp. 17–18
  58. Rawski 2008, p. 573
  59. Naughton 2008, p. 114
  60. Naughton 2008, p. 105
  61. Brandt 2008, p. 22
  62. Brandt 2008, p. 19
  63. Naughton 2008, p. 116
  64. Brandt 2008, p. 128
  65. Schoenleber, H. (23 September 2006). "China's Private Economy Grows Up". 8km.de. Archived from the original on 31 August 2010. Retrieved 28 August 2010.
  66. "China names key industries for state control" Archived 2017-10-11 at the Wayback Machine, China Daily, (2006)
  67. Naughton 2008, p. 129
  68. "China's New Healthcare could cover millions more" Archived 2013-08-26 at the Wayback Machine, Time magazine.
  69. Chovanec, Patrick (2009-06-08). "China's Real Estate Riddle" Archived 2009-06-14 at the Wayback Machine. Far East Economic Review. Retrieved 13 March 2010.
  70. "China overtakes Japan as world's second-biggest economy". February 14, 2011 – via www.bbc.com.
  71. "Commentary: Why Chinese state companies are getting the Communist party's attention". Channel NewsAsia. Archived from the original on 2017-08-18. Retrieved 2017-08-18.
  72. Dalio, Ray. "Principles by Ray Dalio". www.principles.com. Retrieved 2021-01-03.
  73. Xinhua Net. "(Authorized to publish) Xi Jinping's Speech at the Entrepreneur Forum". Xinhua Net. Archived from the original on 10 August 2020. Retrieved 10 August 2020.
  74. General Office of the CCP Central Committee. "Opinions on Strengthening the United Front Work of Private Economy in the New Era". Xinhua net (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 18 October 2020. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
  75. Brandt 2008, p. 3
  76. China has socialist market economy in place (People's Daily Online, 2005).
  77. Heston 2008, p. 28
  78. Fang 2008, p. 184
  79. Brandt 2008, p. 2
  80. Perkins 2008, p. 834
  81. Branstetter 2008, p. 668
  82. Branstetter 2008, p. 669
  83. Benjamin 2008, p. 730
  84. Benjamin 2008, pp. 730–731
  85. Benjamin 2008, p. 774
  86. Weiyin, Zhang, "Completely bury Keynesianism" Archived 2011-05-11 at the Wayback Machine, (February 17, 2009)
  87. Huang 2008, p. 478
  88. Huang 2008, p. 480
  89. Huang 2008, pp. 481–482
  90. Huang 2008, p. 483
  91. Rawski 2008, p. 572
  92. Perkins 2008, p. 862
  93. Rawski 2008, p. 593
  94. "China poised to be world’s largest auto market" Archived 2016-12-31 at the Wayback Machine. NBC News. 2009-02-04.
  95. Rawski 2008, p. 588
  96. Brandt 2008, p. 13
  97. Rawski 2008, p. 570
  98. Branstetter 2008, pp. 635–638
  99. Branstetter 2008, p. 655
  100. Brandt 2008, pp. 1–3
  101. Branstetter 2008, p. 656
  102. Branstetter 2008, p. 676
  103. Branstetter 2008, pp. 640–642
  104. Haggard, Stevens et al (2008), 339
  105. Branstetter 2008, p. 657
  106. Branstetter 2008, pp. 658–659
  107. Allen 2008, p. 522
  108. Perkins 2008, p. 866
  109. Allen 2008, p. 523
  110. Allen 2008, p. 528
  111. Allen 2008, p. 530
  112. Allen 2008, p. 514
  113. Allen 2008, p. 556
  114. Xin Zhao and Russell W. Belk, "Politicizing Consumer Culture: Advertising's Appropriation of Political Ideology in China's Social Transition," Journal of Consumer Research (2008) 35#2 pp 231-244
  115. Wong 2008, p. 431
  116. Wong 2008, p. 440
  117. Wong 2008, p. 434
  118. Calhoun, Craig; Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. (2003), "The Cultural Revolution and the Democracy Movement of 1989: Complexity in Historical Connections", in Law, Kam-yee (ed.), The Chinese cultural revolution reconsidered: beyond purge and holocaust, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 247, ISBN 978-0-333-73835-1, retrieved 2011-10-20
  119. Brandt 2008, pp. 18–19
  120. Kahn 1979, pp. 455
  121. Ang, Yuen Yuen (May–June 2018). "Autocracy With Chinese Characteristics". Foreign Affairs.
  122. Sharma, Shalendra D. (Winter–Spring 2007). "China's Economic Transformation". Global Dialogue. 9 (1–2). Archived from the original on 2013-05-13. Retrieved 2014-09-30.
  123. "WTO | China - Member information". www.wto.org. Retrieved 2020-06-20.
  124. Zhang, Jianping; Liu, Huan (2019-03-09). "改革开放40年："引进来"与"走出去"". Qiushi (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2021-01-03. Retrieved 2020-06-19.
  125. Yuan, Xiaobin. "发达国家对华援助"不手软"". NetEase (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 2021-01-03. Retrieved 2020-06-18.
  126. "中国还需要发达国家的政府援助吗？". Phoenix Television (in Chinese). 2009-11-17. Archived from the original on 2021-01-08. Retrieved 2020-06-18.
  127. "China | ForeignAssistance.gov". www.foreignassistance.gov. Retrieved 2020-06-18.
  128. "Japan to discontinue development assistance projects for China: Taro Kono". The Japan Times. 2018-10-23. Retrieved 2020-06-18.
  129. Dorn, James A. (Fall 2002). "Economic Development and Freedom: The Legacy of Peter Bauer" (PDF). Cato Journal. Cato Institute. 22 (2). Archived (PDF) from the original on 2014-10-06. Retrieved 2014-09-30.
  130. Remnick, David (January–February 1997). "Can Russia Change?". Foreign Affairs. 76 (1): 35–49. doi:10.2307/20047908. JSTOR 20047908. Archived from the original on 2014-04-14. Retrieved 2014-09-30.
  131. Svejnar 2008, p. 68
  132. Svejnar 2008, p. 74
  133. Svejnar 2008, p. 76
  134. Svejnar 2008, pp. 69–70
  135. Svejnar 2008, p. 72
  136. Naughton 2008, p. 96
  137. Heston 2008, p. 37
  138. Heston 2008, p. 46
  139. Perkins 2008, p. 879
  140. Perkins 2008, p. 865
  141. "The Lang-Gu debate: a debate that has not yet ended" Archived 2011-07-23 at the Wayback Machine, 30 October 2008
  142. Perkins 2008, pp. 870–871

Sources
  • Allen, Franklin; et al. (2008), "China's Financial system: Past, present and future", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press
  • Cardenal, Juan Pablo; Araújo, Heriberto (2011), La silenciosa conquista china (in Spanish), Barcelona: Crítica, ISBN 9788498922578
  • Benjamin, Dwayne; et al. (2008), "Income inequality during China's Economic Transition", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Brandt, Loren; et al. (2008), Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Bransetter, Lee; et al. (2008), "China's embrace of globalization", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
  • Cai, Fang; et al. (2008), "The Chinese labor market in the reform era", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Dillon, Michael. Deng Xiaoping: The Man Who Made Modern China (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014).
  • Haggard, Stevens; et al. (2008), "The political economy of private-sector development in China", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Herston, Alan; et al. (2008), "China and Development economics", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Huang, Jikun; et al. (2008), "Agriculture in China's Development: Past Disappointments, Recent Successes, and Future Challenges", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Kau, Michael Y. M. China in the Era of Deng Xiaoping: A Decade of Reform (Routledge, 2016).
  • Naughton, Barry; et al. (2008), "A Political Economy of China's Economic Transitionin China's Great Transformation", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Perkins, Dwight; et al. (2008), "Forecasting China's growth to 2025", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Rawski, G. Thomas; et al. (2008), "China's Industrial Development", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Svejnar, Jan; et al. (2008), "China in light of other transition economies", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Vogel, Ezra F. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Harvard UP, 2011).
  • Walder, Andrew G. (2015). China Under Mao. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-05815-6.
  • Wong, P.W. Christine; et al. (2008), "China's Fiscal system: a work in progress", in Brandt, Loren; Rawski, G. Thomas (eds.), China's Great Transformation, Cambridge: Cambridge university press
  • Zhao, Xin, and Russell W. Belk. (2008) "Politicizing Consumer Culture: Advertising's Appropriation of Political Ideology in China's Social Transition," Journal of Consumer Research, 35#2, pp. 231–244.
This article is issued from Wikipedia. The text is licensed under Creative Commons - Attribution - Sharealike. Additional terms may apply for the media files.