First Army Air Service

First Army Air Service
	1918 lithograph, Air Combat - Western Front
Active	10 August 1918 – 15 April 1919
Country	United States
Branch	United States Army Air Service
Type	Air Service
Role	Command and Control
Part of	American Expeditionary Forces (AEF)
Engagements	; World War I

The First Army Air Service was an Air Service, United States Army unit that fought on the Western Front during World War I as part of the Air Service, First United States Army. The First Army Air Service was the largest and most diverse Air Service combat organization of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, and most American Air Service combat units were assigned to it when assigned to the front.

The organization was demobilized in France on 15 April 1919 with the demobilization of the United States First Army. There is no modern United States Air Force unit that shares its lineage and history.

History

Origins

First Army Air Service units and stations

The history of the First Army Air Service dates to the first American Air Service personnel arriving in France. On 15 January 1918, Colonel William Mitchell was appointed Chief of the Air Service, I Corps, First Army. At this time, the I Corps was being formed for the purpose of administratively handling all of the American troops then on the Western Front. Headquarters was located at Neufchâteau, France. When the first American Aero Squadrons arrived at the front in April 1918, they were assigned to the quiet Toul Sector. At this time, the American Air Service on the front consisted of only a few Aero Squadrons of the 1st Pursuit Group.[1]

At the end of June, 1918, Air Service, I Corps moved from the Toul Sector to the Château-Thierry Sector as part of I Corps. The I Corps Observation Group was already in the Chateau-Thierry Sector was under the command of First Army. The Assistant Chief of Air Service, Zone of Advance, felt it was necessary to coordinate the observation groups of First Army with the pursuit groups. On 10 August 1918, the First American Army Air Service was established.[1]

Organization

The unit was formally organized on 26 August at Ligny-en-Barrois, France. It consisted of the French Aerial Division, which consisted of a large number of pursuit and day bombardment squadrons. In addition, there was one other French pursuit group and three American pursuit groups-one American day-bombardment group-the 1st Army observation, and one French Army artillery group for the adjustment of long-range artillery fire. Eight night-bombardment squadrons of the British Royal Air Force. were to cooperate with the First Army Air Service whenever the tactical situation made such action expedient. The establishment of the First Army Air Service marked the first concentration of American air forces under its own commander.[2]

The front of the First Army, extending from Châtillon-sous-les-Côtes to Pont-sur-Seille, insofar as aviation was concerned, had been very quiet for some time. The enemy performed his photographic reconnaissances with single aircraft, flying at high altitudes, and his pursuit patrols were small and infrequent. In the matter of aerodromes, the enemy was better off than the First American Army, and possessed many small fields within access of any part of the front line. Several aerodromes were unoccupied, and were in such condition that they could be utilized quickly by reinforcements, their barracks and hangars being more or less serviceable.[3]

For the Americans, almost every available field had been taken up and they were short in hangars and billet space, so that by the time the allocation of aviation units had been made to the First Army, the problems of locating and housing the units was a serious one.[3]

Corps Observation Groups

Major John Reynolds, commander of the 91st Aero Squadron, standing next to his Salmson 2.A2 with the Squadron Emblem painted on the side of his aircraft, Gondreville-sur-Moselle Aerodrome, France, 1918

The Corps Air Service of each corps operating under First Army was made up of one squadron for each division and one squadron for the corps. The Air Service of the 2d Colonial Corps consisted entirely of French squadrons. The I Corps observation group was made up of the 1st, 12th, and 50th Aero Squadrons and two French squadrons. In the IV Corps group were the 8th, 135th, and 90th Aero Squadrons and one French squadron. The V Corps group consisted of the 88th, 99th, and 104th Aero Squadrons, only one of which had had a considerable experience in active front-line operations, the corps chief of Air Service and staff remained at the location of the group.[4]

The I Corps group was located in the vicinity of Toul on two aerodromes. The 1st and 12th Aero Squadrons were stationed at Gengault Aerodrome just east of Toul, which had formerly been occupied by the 1st Pursuit Group in the spring of 1918. The 50th Aero and 211th (French) Squadrons occupied the newly constructed Bicqueley Aerodrome, just south of Toul. The IV Corps group entire occupied Ourches Aerodrome. The French squadrons of the Air Service of the 2d French Colonial Corps were located at Rumont, to the northeast of Bar-le-Duc. The V Corps group occupied Souilly Aerodrome. With the exception of the V Corps group, each Corps Air Service was established and ready for operations by the first week in September. The V Corps group was not completed until the day of the Battle of Saint-Mihiel, when the 88th Squadron arrived from the Vesle. The one new squadron of the I Corps group, the 50th Aero, had but recently arrived at the front. It was equipped with Airco DH.4 airplanes with the new Liberty engine. Two of the three American squadrons of the IV Corps group were also equipped with the De Havilland DH.4 Liberty; the 90th Squadron had French Salmson 2.A2 airplanes. In the V Corps group all squadrons were equipped with the Salmson.[4]

First Army Observation Group

During the inactive period on the Toul sector covering the late spring and summer of 1918 and up to the St. Mihiel offensive which commenced on 12 September, army observation in the American Air Service was carried out by one unit, the 91st Aero Squadron. The 91st served as a nucleus for the long-range reconnaissance missions for First Army; while the various Corps observation groups were used for battlefield, tactical observation missions. Previous to its assignment to the First Army, the 91st worked under orders of the Chef de I'Aeronautique of the 8th French Army. The group added two new aero squadrons, the 24th and the 9th, but as these had not had actual battle experience, they did little work other than perfecting their own training. The 91st Aero Squadron, therefore, took care of all of the long-range day reconnaissances.[5]

1st Day Bombardment Group

11th Aero Squadron posing with its De Havilland DH.4s (Note "Mr Jiggs" on each fuselage), Maulan Aerodrome, France, November 1918

1st Day Bombardment Group had its beginning 18 May 1918, when the 96th Aero Squadron, the first unit of day bombardment, was established at Amanty Aerodrome to begin active operations against the enemy. The flying equipment of the 96th Squadron consisted of ten Breguet 14B.2 bombing airplanes, equipped with 300 horsepower type 12 F. E. V. Renault motors.[2]

The 1st Day Bombardment Group had a threefold object: the destruction of material, reconnaissance, and observation of enemy tactics in combat. Except during an offensive there was but little opportunity to attack massed troops. The principal mission during such a period was to destroy the enemy's transport lines by which supplies and personnel were delivered to the front, or by which ore and other products of military importance were delivered to the rear. The most favorable targets were the railroad centers where the traffic arteries converged. Long distance raids proved wonderful opportunities for deep reconnaissance, especially of enemy railroad movements. Any pronounced current of railroad traffic, going in one direction, or converging at one point, would be reported by every observer making that particular raid. Further confirmation was unnecessary, for the observers were obliged to submit their written raid reports without consulting each other. Photographs of the bursts often revealed troop and construction activity at the objectives, and were subject to careful interpretation.[2]

1st Pursuit Wing

Lithograph of 1st Lieutenant Frank Luke "Balloon Busting", 27th Aero Squadron.

Two American pursuit groups were in process of organization for the establishment of the 1st Pursuit Wing. These were already located at Gengault and Vaucouleurs Aerodromes.[6]

All of the American pursuit squadrons in existence, with the exception of the 17th and 148th Aero Squadrons, which were operating with the British, were concentrated in the 1st Pursuit Wing, with headquarters at Toul, and the 1st Pursuit Group, with headquarters at Rembercourt Aerodrome. The 1st Pursuit Wing consisted of the 2d and 3d Pursuit Groups; the 2d Pursuit Group composed of the 13th, 22d, 49th and 139th Aero Squadrons, and the 3d Pursuit Group consisted of the 28th, 93d, 103d, and 213th Aero Squadrons. The 1st Pursuit Group consisted of the 27th, 94th, 95th, and 147th Aero Squadrons. One French Group (G.C.16) was allocated to the 1st American Pursuit Wing commander for duty in connection with the offensive.[6]

With these units at his disposal, and with the general conditions of the air program for the offensive in mind, the Chief of Air Service, First Army, made certain plans for the pursuit units for the attack. He decided to utilize the American pursuit all along the front for the purpose of protective barrage at all altitudes, with incidental duties as occasion arose, of a more combative nature, such as ground strafing, balloon destruction, and offensive patrols. Offensive patrols cross the enemy line in sufficient strength to cruise over his rear area, search out enemy aircraft, and attack them, with the object of causing maximum casualties and inflicting the greatest possible damage to his air service, and with the further object of obtaining definite moral superiority.[6]

Preparation

In August 1918, the situation of the enemy in the St. Mihiel sector was approximately the same as that described in Toul sector. The sector of the front from Saint-Mihiel north to Châtillon-sous-les-Côtes was organized in approximately the same manner as the Toul or Saint-Mihiel sector. The enemy was favored by the terrain, which offered many natural positions of great strength. These positions had been well organized for a prolonged defense. Some intimation of an impending allied offensive in this sector had reached the enemy, and immediately preceding the attack of 12 September he commenced a redistribution of his available forces, especially with a view to echeloning them in depth. As far as was known at the time, the enemy strength in the sector remained about the same as it had been throughout the summer months.[2]

In the air the strength of the enemy continued the same as it had been since the previous spring. A few pursuit patrols of Fokker airplanes were reported as operating in this sector, but it was quite probable that these were new airplanes received as replacements for the Albatross and Pfalz type formerly in use. Individual observation and photograph airplanes operated over the sector, but no unusual number of hostile aircraft was at any time encountered or reported before the opening of the Saint-Mihiel offensive.[6]

The operations undertaken during the period of preparation. Visual reconnaissance, Photographic reconnaissance, Artillery fire adjustment, and Exercises with artillery and infantry.[2]

Visual reconnaissance of the corps and division sectors was carried out as a routine matter at dawn and twilight of each day. A few other special visual reconnaissance missions were dispatched to secure information of a particular nature in well-defined areas. The work of visual reconnaissance was valuable only in that it kept the command informed at all times of the situation in the enemy lines opposite each corps. The information secured in this manner was for the most part of a negative nature, due to the inactivity of the enemy at this period, but it served the purpose of assuring the staff of each corps that there were no new developments in the general tactical situation.[2]

Photographic reconnaissance, during the period of preparation, consisted for the most part of taking oblique views of the enemy territory immediately opposite the front lines of each corps. This type of photograph proved of great value in the preparation of detailed plans for the attack.[4]

No great amount of adjustment of artillery fire took place, due to the necessity of veiling all preparations for the offensive. The shoots executed were therefore merely those necessary to register the fire of a few batteries on certain points.[4]

Exercises were conducted as frequently as possible in each corps for the purpose of preparing the infantry and artillery to cooperate successfully with the airplane observer during the coming offensive. All operations were greatly hindered by the unfavorable weather which prevailed during the early days of September.[2]

The 1st Day Bombardment Group was formed two days before the offensive opened, and included the 11th, 20th, and 96th Aero Squadrons. The 11th and 20th Squadrons had not completed their squadron organization. Some of their pilots and observers had seen action with the French squadrons, but most of them made their first flights over the lines during this offensive. The two new squadrons operated De Havilland DH.4 airplanes, with Liberty motors. The armament was the same as that of the French Breguet, save that the pilot had two Marlin machine guns, synchronized to shoot through the propeller. The De Havilland DH.4s carried the British Wimperis bomb sight attached to the outside of the fuselage. This sight permitted the observer to aim at the target while standing, a position which kept him in readiness to fight off an attack by hostile aircraft.[7]

During the period preparatory to the attack, from 29 August to 12 September, the 1st Pursuit Wing, working on the front between the Meuse and the Moselle Rivers, maintained patrols sufficient to prevent any reconnaissance, visual or photographic, of the area Lionville, Beuconville, Domeurs, Francheville, Becq and Gironville. The Wing commander divided the sector for this purpose into two areas, the western running from St. Mihiel to Essey, both inclusive, and the eastern, Seicheprey to Pont-sur-Seille, both inclusive, and gave orders that a double tier barrage should be maintained from daylight to dark over these sectors. The low patrol, acting at from 2,500 to 3,500 meters, and the higher patrol at from 3,500 to 5,500 meters. Each patrol overlapped by 15 minutes, and were not permitted to penetrate over the enemy lines more than five kilometers. By 5 September, the wing had made an area approximately 5 kilometers over the enemy's lines practically safe for corps observation machines to operate. Some close protection work was ordered to act in cooperation with the army reconnaissance squadron, and one particularly dangerous balloon near Mont Sec was attacked repeatedly.[6]

Operations

The St. Mihiel offensive is chiefly remarkable in that it was the first all-American large scale operation of World War I. During the four days of the American offensive which cleared the St. Mihiel salient of the enemy, weather conditions, except on 14 September, were such as to greatly hinder the carrying out of aerial operations.

Tactical Reconnaissance

12th Aero Squadron Salmson 2.A2, Julvecourt Aerodrome, France, November 1918

On the morning of 12 September, when the attack was launched, a heavy mist, low-lying cloud banks, and intermittent rain combined to make all aerial observation extremely difficult. Notwithstanding this fact, command airplanes for the corps and divisions, infantry contact patrols, and artillery surveillance airplanes performed their respective missions throughout the hours of daylight. The command was thus kept informed of the general progress of the battle and at periodic intervals was given the first line of our advancing troops located by observers executing the missions of infantry contact. Missions operating in cooperation with the artillery were unable, on account of atmospheric conditions, to accomplish much work of value in the regulation of artillery fire on fugitive targets, but, taking advantage of momentary gaps in the clouds and mist, they were able to observe and report upon the location of such targets from time to time and to furnish other information of considerable value to the artillery. The work accomplished on 13 September was virtually a repetition of that of the 12th, for the same unfavorable weather conditions continued.[2]

14 September was the one day during the offensive which was favorable for the conduct of aerial operations by the Corps Air Service. Missions of every type were dispatched, throughout the hours of daylight. Command airplanes, infantry contact patrols, and visual reconnaissance missions kept the command well informed as to the progress of the attacking troops and of the situation within the enemy lines to a depth of 8 kilometers. Photographic missions were executed and resulted in a large number of successful photographs of the enemy's front-line positions. Artillery surveillance airplanes secured much valuable information which was immediately sent by radio to the artillery posts of command and later confirmed by both dropped messages and telephonic reports upon the return of the observer to the aerodrome. Some successful adjustments of the fire of designated batteries upon fugitive targets located in the enemy lines were accomplished. From early morning of the 14th there was a very noticeable increase of hostile pursuit aviation. Some of the best enemy flights operated along the sector and observation airplanes were repeatedly attacked, but in the majority of cases successfully defended themselves and accomplished their assigned missions. On 15 September, unfavorable weather again greatly hindered aerial operations; the work done was similar to that accomplished during the first two days of the offensive.[2]

Strategic Reconnaissance

Targets were indicated by the Chief of Staff, First Army for strategic reconnaissance missions deep behind German lines to be carried out by the First Army Observation Group. These targets were various artillery objectives, to be photographed just before and on every day during the attack until further notice. A continuous barrage of observation planes was to be maintained over enemy territory throughout the entire day. Formations of three planes were scheduled to leave the aerodrome at intervals of two hours, beginning at daybreak, to reconnoiter the enemy's rear areas. It was considered necessary to employ formations of at least three planes, as there was no pursuit protection available and the friendly pursuit patrols did not penetrate the enemy lines to the same depth that the army reconnaissance planes were required to go. It was certain all these planes would be vigorously attacked by enemy aircraft.[5]

However, owing to the prevailing adverse weather conditions, it was necessary to disregard the schedules that were prepared the preceding day as the low hanging clouds rendered formation flying impossible. Photography was out of the question. Single planes were dispatched whenever the weather permitted. The planes were required to fly at low altitudes, under the clouds but proved successful, in that they could climb into the clouds and to safety in case of the appearance of enemy aircraft, or when especially heavy and accurate anti-aircraft fire was encountered. During the first day the enemy territory was successfully reconnoitered to a depth of 60 kilometers. Not one mission was carried out at an altitude exceeding 1,000 meters. This was accomplished without the loss of a single plane or even a single casualty. However, because of the rapid increase in numbers of enemy pursuit planes as the battle progressed, the successful reconnoitering of the enemy back areas became extremely difficult. The reinforcing enemy pursuit was largely equipped with the Fokker D VII scouts. This plane had a considerable advantage in climbing speed over the Salmson. However, the horizontal speed of the latter plane was greater at high altitudes, thereby enabling it to break off a combat at any desirable time. The effective work done and the comparatively small number of casualties suffered during the St. Mihiel offensive, gave evidence of the excellent training and experience gained during the previous three months.[5]

Day Bombardment

Breguet 14B.2 bomber of the 96th Aero Squadron

Bombing operations during the offensive were directed against hostile troops concentrations immediately behind the enemy's lines as primary objectives, and raids to railroads centers which were congested with troops and supplies as secondary objectives. To interfere with traffic of reinforcements and supplies from the sector east of the Moselle river it was found expedient to send bombing expeditions against the bridges, and bridgeheads, between Pont-a-Mousson and Metz. The main object of day bombardment during the offensive was to throw into confusion and destroy enemy troops marching into, or retreating from battle. During the days of exploitation the bombers continued to hamper as much as possible the enemy's withdrawal of personnel and material.[7]

Late at night, 11 September, orders were received to hold the 9th Aero Squadron on the alert early in the morning, to bomb and machine gun hostile troops in front of our advancing infantry. To carry out these orders the twelve available Breguets were divided into flights of four each. The plan was to send the flights over to attack at 30-minute intervals, and thus keep up the enemy troops under a continuous bombardment. The first order to raid was received at 10 A.M. The objective was troop concentration at Buxieres, in the town and along the roads radiating from it. Because of the strong wind and the low cloud ceiling it was considered impracticable to attempt even these small formation flights. Consequently, that the order be obeyed, the leading team of the first flight volunteered to attempt the mission alone, and to determine, if possible, the best method of conducting troop bombing under the existing unfavorable conditions. The team did not return. It was later learned that the Breguet came down in flames south of Commercy, while returning to the aerodrome. The mission had been accomplished. After this first loss of the offensive it was decided to send all the airplanes on single missions, and not dissipate the strength of the squadron in small formations.[7]

The casualties of the bombers were heavy. The 96th Aero Squadron lost sixteen pilots and observers during the first four days of the attack, which is a high percentage of loss even in a day bombardment unit. The 11th Aero Squadron lost twelve of its flying personnel, and the 20th Aero Squadron three. The total casualties of the group for the offensive numbered thirty-one. However, the work done by day bombardment during the St. Mihiel offensive is worthy of praise. The terrific weather made formation flying, upon which bombing depends, almost impossible. The muddy flying field caused so many broken propellers that the formations which crossed the lines were never large enough for self-protection. The main lesson learned from this offensive was that large formations must be employed by day bombardment when the enemy aircraft opposition is strong and persistent. As it was impossible to obtain sufficient replacements in airplanes and spare parts the formations were small and the losses heavy.[7]