Lobster War

The Lobster War (also known as the Lobster Operation; Portuguese: Guerra da Lagosta; French: Conflit de la langouste) was a dispute over spiny lobsters which occurred from 1961 to 1963 between Brazil and France. The Brazilian government refused to allow French fishing vessels to catch spiny lobsters 100 miles (160 km) off the Brazilian northeast coast,[5] arguing that lobsters "crawl along the continental shelf", while the French maintained that "lobsters swim" and that, therefore, they might be caught by any fishing vessel from any country. The dispute was resolved unilaterally by Brazil, which extended its territorial waters to a 200-nautical-mile (370 km; 230 mi) zone, taking in the disputed lobsters' bed.[6]

Caribbean spiny lobster
For the documentary television series, see Lobster Wars and Machias Seal Island.
Lobster War

A Brazilian Air Force Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress flying over the French escort vessel Tartu, off the coast of Brazil in 1963.
Date1961–1963
Location
Waters of Pernambuco, Brazil
Result

Peaceful resolution of the conflict: Withdrawal of French vessels;

  • End of the mobilization of warships on both sides
  • Extension of Brazil's territorial waters to a 200-nautical-mile zone
  • Fishing authorization granted to French lobster fishing boats for 5 years, providing a portion be given to Brazilian lobster fishermen
Belligerents

 Brazil

France

Commanders and leaders
João Goulart
Ad. Arnoldo Toscano		 Charles de Gaulle
Strength

Brazilian Navy fleet in the dispute zone:
1 Corvette

  • Ipiranga

6 Destroyers

2 Cruisers

1 Aircraft carrier

1 Submarine

Brazilian Air Force:
1 Squadron

1 Squadron

1 Squadron

Offshore Brazil:
First Escort squadron
1 Destroyer:

  • Tartu

1 Aviso

  • Paul Goffeny

Offshore West Africa:
1 Aircraft carrier

1 Cruiser

Second Escort squadron
7 Destroyer:

  • Cassard
  • Jauréguiberry
  • Picard
  • Le Gascon
  • L'Agenais
  • Le Béarnais
  • Le Vendéen

1 Tanker

  • La Baise
Casualties and losses
None[1][2][3] None[4]

Although this historical incident of coercive diplomacy may have taken place long before the drafting of the UNCLOS, the dispute ended with the signing of an agreement on 10 December 1964,[4] which granted to twenty-six French ships the right of fishing for a period no longer than five years, on the grounds that they delivered to Brazilian fishermen a certain amount of profit over their fishing activities in the so-called "designated areas".[4]

Incident and dispute

In 1961, some groups of French fishermen who were operating very profitably off the coast of Mauritania decided to extend their search to the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, settling on a spot off the coast of Brazil where lobsters are found on submerged ledges at depths of 250–650 feet (76–198 m).[7] But local fishermen complained that large boats were coming from France to catch lobster off the state of Pernambuco, so the Brazilian Admiral Arnoldo Toscano ordered two corvettes to sail to the area where the French fishing boats were located.[8] Seeing that the fishermen's claim was justifiable, the captain of the Brazilian vessel then demanded that the French boats receded to deeper water, leaving the continental shelf to smaller Brazilian vessels. The situation became very tense once the French rejected this demand and radioed a message asking for the French government to send a destroyer to accompany the lobster boats, which prompted the Brazilian government to put its many ships on state of alert.

Squadron of the Brazilian Navy. In the center, the cruiser Almirante Tamandaré, escorted by four Fletcher-class vessels.

On the same day, Brazilian Foreign Minister Hermes Lima considered the French approach as an act of hostility, saying: "The attitude of France is inadmissible, and our government will not retreat. The lobster will not be caught."[9] He called a secret meeting with his assistants to review the latest developments in the lobster war with France. Meanwhile, French President Charles de Gaulle reacted to perceived Brazilian interference with the French fishing boats that were looking for lobsters off the Brazilian coastby dispatching on 21 February the 2750-ton T 53-class destroyer Tartu to watch over the fishing boats,[n 1][10] but it decided to withdraw to soothe tension.[11] The Brazilian President João Goulart then gave France 48 hours to withdraw all the French boats, but as they refused to leave the area the Brazilian Navy apprehended the French vessel Cassiopée off of the Brazilian coast on 2 January 1962.[4] By April 1963 both nations were considering whether they should go to war over lobsters or not.[12]

Tribunal acts

On the scientific thesis

On 6 July 1966, the Administrative Tribunal of Rennes summarized the French government claims that lobsters are like fish, that is, that they swim about in the open sea and therefore, could not be considered part of the continental shelf. Brazil claimed that lobsters are like oysters in that they cling to the bottom of the ocean and therefore, were part of the continental shelf.[13] Admiral Paulo Moreira da Silva, Brazil's Navy expert in the field of oceanography who had been sent to assist the diplomatic committee during the general discussions,[14] argued that for Brazil to accept the French scientific thesis that a lobster would be considered a fish when it "leaps" on the seafloor, then they would have in the same manner to accept the Brazilian premise that when a kangaroo "hops" it would be considered a bird.[14]

On the shipowner claims

It was also observed that the claims of MM. Celton and Stephen, two of the shipowners who sought compensation from the French State for losses occurred during the 1963 January–March fishing season had no right to any compensation at all, once the French Government could not be held responsible for the unsuccessful season due to a unilateral position of the Brazilian Government.[15] Decisions of the Conseil d'État then dismissed the allegations that the French Government had authorized the plaintiff shipowners to send their vessels to go fish for lobsters on high seas, or off the coast of Brazil, stating that the licenses given to the plaintiffs accorded to the masters of the vessels and not the shipowners. That the derogation authorized the masters to exercise full command of their vessels as for fishing on high seas and not in a particular zone. There is no evidence that the French Government had authorized such action, their claims were rejected.[11]

See also

Notes
  1. On 21 February 1963, sailed from Toulon a task force headed by the aircraft carrier Clemenceau, followed by the cruisers De Grasse, Cassard, Jauréguiberry, the destroyer Tartu, the corvettes Le Picard, Le Gascon, L'Agenais, Le Béarnais, Le Vendéen (all T52 class), the tanker La Baise and Paul Goffeny. Initially, it should be only "one more commission" off the west coast of Africa to show the flag and perform routine exercises.

References
  1. Braga, Cláudio da Costa (2009). A Guerra da Lagosta. Armazém das Letras. pp. 90–165–166–167. ISBN 978-8590479017.
  2. "O dia em que a lagosta virou peixe". FAB Ministério da Defesa. Retrieved 2014-05-11.
  3. "Navios de Guerra Brasileiros". Navios Brasileiros. Retrieved 2014-05-11.
  4. Rainer Lagoni; Peter Ehlers; Marian Paschke; Duygu Damar (2011). Recent developments in the law of the sea. LIT Verlag Münster. p. 26. ISBN 978-3-643-10946-0.
  5. AP (25 Feb 1963). "France Recalls Ship Sent to Lobster War". The Milwaukee Journal: 22. Retrieved 20 February 2012.
  6. Osmańczyk, Edmund Jan; Mango, Anthony (2004). Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements. 2 G-M. Routledge. p. 1334. ISBN 0415939224..
  7. Reynaud, Paul (1964), In The foreign policy of Charles de Gaulle: a critical assessment, Odyssey Press, p. 118. LCCN 64-529.
  8. (1963), In Arab Observer National Publications House (Cairo, Egypt), p. 142. OCLC 2641710
  9. "Brazil: Force de Flap". Time. March 8, 1963. Retrieved 12 October 2010.
  10. "Ships Augment 'Lobster War' Water Patrol". St. Petersburg Times. 79 (216): 5. 25 Feb 1963. Retrieved 20 February 2012.
  11. Kulski, W. W. (1966), In De Gaulle and the World:The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic, Syracuse University Press, p. 360. ISBN 0-8156-0052-6.
  12. Ziegler, David W. (1990), In War, peace, and international politics, Scott Foresman, p. 362. ISBN 0-673-52023-4
  13. Ziegler, David W. (1990), In War, peace, and international politics, Scott, Foresman, p. 360. ISBN 0-673-52023-4.
  14. Fehlberg, Carlos. "Solução surge através da argumentação e um debate entre os oficiais da Marinha, após crise diplomática chegar ao extremo". Institutojoaogoulart.org.br. Instituto Joao Goulart. Retrieved 19 March 2015.
  15. Lauterpacht, E. (1974) In International Law Reports, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 47, p. 2, ISBN 0-521-46392-0.
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