William Bailey (soldier)

Stanley William Bailey was a British military officer in World War I and World War II who reached the rank of Colonel, most notable for being the head and then political advisor of the British Special Operations Executive Liaison Mission to Chetniks of Draža Mihailović in period 25 December 1942 — 29 January 1944. British policy toward Mihailović was shaped by reports of Bailey who was one of the most responsible for wrecking the position of Mihailović and Chetniks with British and consequently Allied side.

Stanley William Bailey
Nickname(s)Bill, Miloš
Allegiance United Kingdom
British Army
RankColonel
Battles/warsWorld War I and World War II

The Chetniks followed requests of Allied command sent before the offensive against Rommel in Africa and organized a campaign against Axis communications through German occupied Serbia and further to Thessaloniki and Libya. Bailey reinforced British missions with Chetniks with well trained military sappers to help Chetniks to be more effective in sabotaging German lines of communications. The campaign of Mihailović's Chetniks against Axis communications was probably instrumental in the victory of the Allies against Rommel in Africa. The British command praised Mihailović for this successes while Hitler blamed Chetniks in Serbia for his defeats in Africa and at the beginning of 1943 issued an order for complete annihilation of all Chetnik forces.

When the crisis of Allied forces in Africa had passed the Chetniks assumed a policy of tactical inactivity which was criticized by the British command. In order to convince Mihailović that the British could "make him or break him" Bailey proposed a new firm position of the British side toward Mihailović and his Chetniks.[1] Bailey offered Pavle Đurišić the position of Chetnik leader and to replace Mihailović, which Đurišić refused. Mihailović launched a campaign against Axis positions in Eastern Bosnia in October 1943 inflicting hundreds of casualties on Axis forces and liberating Višegrad, Rogatica and many other places, and the British media attributed all those Chetnik victories against Axis to rival Communist forces. Bailey prevented Chetniks from disarming the Italian Venezia division after the capitulation of Italy and organized capture of their arms by communists who used it to push Chetniks out of the valley of river Lim. Bailey left Chetnik HQ on 29 January 1944 after first refusing an American proposal to leave at least one member of their missions at Mihailović HQ.

Early life

Bailey completed Emanuel School in Wandsworth. Before the World War II Bailey lived in Kingdom of Yugoslavia for some time when he was engineer in Trepča Mines and fluently spoke Serbian language.[2] During the World War I Bailey was a member of British SOE team in Athens, Greece when the king of Greece was removed and pro-Allied Venizelist government installed.[3]

World War II

When he returned from a mission in Canada, Bailey was parachuted into Mihailović's HQ on 25 December 1942.[4] The chief of Bailey's staff in Chetnik HQ was Major Kenneth Greenlees.[5]

Head of Allied mission at Chetnik HQ

Apart from this mission headed by Bailey, there were nine other British missions to Chetnik HQ starting from April 1943.[6] During 1943 a number of British military missions were sent to various Chetnik corps in Serbia.[7] Bailey reported that Mihailović had overwhelming support of people in Serbia while strength of Communists there was negligible.[8] Mihailović gave code name Miloš to Bailey, as association to Kosovo where Bailey lived for longer period during his service in Yugoslavia, or to Serb hero of Battle of Kosovo Miloš Obilić.[9]

Crisis in Africa

The British General Harold Alexander sent personal telegram to Draža Mihailović before the offensive against Rommel in Africa, requesting him to organize a large-scale campaign against Axis lines of communication in order to obstruct transport of German war material through Serbia to Thessaloniki and further to Libya.[10] In May 1942 Mihailović demanded heavy explosives from the British command to be used for destruction of the German supply lines running through Serbia and Aegean to North Africa German troops.[11] To support Western Desert campaign Chetniks organized a campaign against communications of Axis through German occupied Serbia. This campaign was witnessed by Hudson.[12] On 1 December 1942 Mihalovic received a greeting from the Chief of the British Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke[13] who expressed his felicitations for the wonderful undertaking of the Yugoslav Army.[14] After his arrival to Chetnik HQ, Bailey decided to reinforce British missions to Chetniks with well trained military sappers who could help Chetniks to be more effective in sabotaging German lines of communications.[15] The campaign of Mihailović's Chetniks against Axis communications was probably instrumental in victory of Allies against Rommel in Africa, so British Near East Command jointly sent a telegram to Mihailovic on 16 August 1943 stating:"With admiration we are following your directed operations which are of inestimable value to our allied cause."[16] Hitler blamed Chetniks in Serbia for his defeat in Africa and issued an order for complete annihilation of all Chetnik forces also sent to Mussolini in a letter on 16 February 1943.[17]

We have no other choice, but to annihilate all Chetniks and against the bandits use the most brutal means.

— Adolf Hitler[18][19]

Bailey confirmed earlier Hudson's reports about agreements of Montenegrin Chetniks and Italians emphasizing that he found "no evidence of direct collaboration between Mihailović himself and the Germans and Italians."[20]

While he was in Lipovo, Bailey went to Kolašin three times, once in February when he visited Pavle Đurišić and inspected Chetnik units before their departure to Neretva.[21] Bailey offered to Đurišićs to replace Mihailović as Chetnik leader, but Đurišić refused and informed Mihailović about this offer personally.[22]

British convince Mihailović they could "make him or break him"

When the crisis of Allies in Africa had passed the Chetniks reverted to policy of tactical inactivity toward Axis, which was criticized by the British.[23] In his report sent to SEO HQ in Cairo Bailey emphasized:"...the time has come to treat Mihailović firmly. He must be made to realize that we could make him or break him."[24]

United Kingdom supported Communist forces in Yugoslavia with substantial supplies while BBC repeatedly gave credit to communists for anti-Axis actions of Chetniks, especially during September and October 1943.[25] This enraged Chetniks to the extent that before Charles Armstrong was dispatched to Chetnik headquarter, Colonel Bailey advised him that Chetniks were angry and that Mihailović "won't hear of British anymore".[26] When Armstrong arrived to Chetnik HQ at the end of September 1943 he became the head of British mission and Bailey assumed position of his political advisor.[27] Bailey organized handing over arms of Italian Venezia division of 8,000 Italian soldiers to communists instead to Chetniks.[28] The final consequence with final consequence was that Chetniks were forced to leave this valley of river Lim.[29]

The head of American mission Walter R. Mansfield proposed to retain one member of British and American army in Chetnik HQ after Armstrong and Mansfield left it, but Bailey refused this proposal.[30] Bailey left Yugoslavia for Bari on 29 January 1944.[31]

The historian Wheeler emphasize that Bailey did not have enough qualifications, education and political background to do his job properly in Mihailovićs HQ. Bailey was instrumental for wrecking the position of Mihailović with British side. It was Bailey who informed the British command about the outburst of drunk Mihailović at some baptismal ceremony when he stated that he has intention to fight Axis only after he first deal with his main enemies Partisans, Croats, Muslims and Ustaše.[32]

See also

References
  1. (Ford 1992, p. 9):" Bailey informed Cairo that "the time has come to treat Mihailovic firmly. He must be made to realise that we can make him or break him...." Just how the British were to convince Mihailovich that they could "make him or break him".
  2. (Latas 1979, p. 367)
  3. (Barker 1976, p. 97)
  4. (MacLaren 2011, p. 137): "Meanwhile Bailey, having returned from his recruiting mission to Canada, had been parachuted to Mihailović's headquarters on Christmas Eve 1942"
  5. (Ford 1992, p. 4):"Col. William Bailey, head of the British mission to Mihailovich's headquarters, and Maj. Kenneth Greenlees, Bailey's chief of staff. "
  6. (MacLaren 2011, p. 137)
  7. Macedonian Review. Kulturen Zhivot. 1981. p. 200. In addition, they sent, in the course of 1943, a number of military missions to various Chetnik corps in Serbia.
  8. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ... Congress. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1980. p. 4678. Colonel Bailey, who was in charge of the British mission through most of 1943, repeatedly made the point that ... army—they added that they fought against the Germans only in self defense— but wished solely to fight the Chetniks
  9. (Latas 1979, p. 367):"Дража му је дао симболично име Милош, што је требало да асоцира на Косово, где је Бејли провео дуже времена за време своје службе у Југославији, односно на косовског јунака Милоша Обилића. "
  10. (Jukić 1974, p. 136)
  11. (Milazzo 1975, p. 103):"Mihailović ... requested from the British Middle East command heavy explosives for the purpose of destroying the German supply lines running south to the Aegean for Rommel's troops in North Africa."
  12. (Repac 1957, p. 70):"The campaign against Axis communications had been witnessed by Colonel William Hudson, who at that time was the sole British officer attached to Mihailovich."
  13. General Mihailovich: The World's Verdict : a Selection of Articles on the First Resistance Leader in Europe Published in the World Press. John Bellows. 1947. p. 131. ... joined the ranks of our Army in the Near East in the triumphant hour, but also of your undefeatable Chetniks under your command, who are fighting night and day under the most difficult conditions. December 1st, 1942. General Alan Brooke.
  14. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ... Congress. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1956. p. 4989. The Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, pursuant to Yugoslavia's unity Day, December 1, 1942, sent the following greeting to the War Minister and the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command of King Peter II to Army Gen Dragoljub M Mihailovich: In the name of the British Imperial General Staff I cannot let the twenty-fourth anniversary of the unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes into one Kingdom pass without expressing my felicitations for the wonderful undertaking of the Yugoslav Army. I am not thinking only of the forces which have joined the ranks of our army in the Near East in the triumphant hour but also of your undefeatable Chetniks under your command who are fighting night and day under the most difficult war conditions.
  15. (Ogden 2010, p. 69):"Following Colonel Bailey's decision to reinforce the chetnik Missions with trained military engineers, so that they could more effectively sabotage German lines of communication and...."
  16. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ... Congress. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1956. p. 12782. During 1942 Africa crisis, Mihailovic's all-out campaign against Axis communications, especially vital to Belgrade-Nis-Salonika line, was probably instrumental for saving Africa from Rommel. British Near East Command jointly wired Mihailovic August 16, 1943: 'With admiration we are following your directed operations which are of inestimable value to our allied cause."
  17. (Minich 1975, p. 6):"As for his defeat in Africa, Hitler put the blame on Serbian insurgents. Hitler's order for complete annihilation of all the chetnik forces was sent to Mussolini in a letter dated February 16, 1943,...
  18. The South Slav Journal. Dositey Obradovich Circle. 2003. p. 121. Hitler had said frankly: „We have no other choice, but to annihilate all Chetniks and against the bandits use the most brutal means."
  19. (Piekałkiewicz 1984, p. 185):"Hitler zu Graf Ciano: »Es bleibe ... nichts übrig, als alle Tschetniks restlos auszurotten und gegen die Banden mit brutaltsten Mitteln vorzugehen."
  20. (Ford 1992, p. 9):""no evidence of direct collaboration between Mihailovic himself and the Germans and Italians.""
  21. (Latas 1979, p. 372):"За време свог боравка у Липову пуковник Бејли је трипут одлазио у Колашин. Једном је (у фебруа- ру) посетио Павла Буришића и нзвршио смотру четника пред њихов одлазак на Неретву, други пут у марту и трећи пут у првој ..."
  22. (Redžić 2002, p. 566):"Кнежевић је на то одговорио "да је мајор Ђуришић до јуче био капетан, да је велики јунак, да је одликован Карађорђевом Звездом, али да није дорастао да буде вођа једног целог народа". И пуковник Бејли је тих дана питао Ђуришића за пристанак да замени Ђенерала Михаиловића. "Као верни официр свом врховном команданту, Павле је одбио предлог у корист ђенерала Михаиловића и лично (га) обавестио ...." о њему"
  23. (Repac 1957, p. 70):"After the crisis in Africa had passed, the Chetniks reverted to policy of tactical inactivity. For this they were subsequently criticized by the British"
  24. (Ford 1992, p. 9):" Bailey informed Cairo that "the time has come to treat Mihailovic firmly. He must be made to realise that we can make him or break him...." Just how the British were to convince Mihailovich that they could "make him or break him".
  25. (Charters & Tugwell 1990, p. 73)
  26. (Pešić 2002, p. 78)
  27. Odense University Studies in History and Social Sciences. Odense University Press. 1978. p. 535. The mission was headed by Brigadier C. D. Armstrong with S. W. Bailey as political adviser...
  28. (Charters & Tugwell 1990, p. 73):"Bailey brought the Venezia division under Allied command, thus depriving the Chetniks of the possibility of disarming it"
  29. (Николић 2009, p. 440):"Да је пуковник Бејли спречавао четнике да разоружавају Италијане, потврдио је и Бригадир Чарлс Армстронг: ,,Морам изјавити да је ..."
  30. Časopis za suvremenu povijest. 1990. p. 36.
  31. Serbian Democratic Forum. Serbian National Committee. 1975. p. 54. It is to be noted that Colonel Bailey, chief of the first British Mission to Mihailovich, left Yugoslavia for Bari on January 29, 1944.
  32. (West 2012):"The historian Mark Wheeler makes the point that men such as Bill Bailey on the Mihailovié staff did not have a golden background: 'These people ... Bailey more than anyone helped to wreck the career of Mihailović. He reported back to the British the outburst of 28 February 1943, when Mihailovié said that he wanted to liquidate all his enemies, ...In Montenegro, at the end of February, Draza Mihailovic' had made an imprudent and possibly drunken speech in which ."

Sources
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