Bergmann Offensive

The Bergmann Offensive (Turkish: Bergmann Atağı; in Turkish literature Turkish: Köprüköy ve Azap Muharebeleri, "Battles of Köprüköy and Azap" Russian: Берхманнский прорыв; in Russian literature Russian: Кёприкейская операция, "Köprüköy operation") was the first engagement of the Caucasus Campaign during World War I. General Georgy Bergmann, commander of I Caucasian Army Corps, took the initiative against the Ottoman Empire.[5]

Bergmann Offensive
The limit of the Russian advance into Anatolia during the Caucasus Campaign (1914–1918)
Date 2–21 November 1914 Location Erzurum Vilayet, Ottoman Empire Result Ottoman victory
Belligerents
Ottoman Empire	Russian Empire
Commanders and leaders
Hasan Izzet Pasha Galip Pasha Lieutenant Colonel Guse Yusuf İzzet Pasha Ali İhsan Pasha Şerif Bey Arif Bey Ziya Bey Behaeddin Shakir Yakub Cemil	I. Vorontsov-Dashkov Georgy Bergmann Nikolai Yudenich General Baratov General Istomin
Strength
96,000[1] 60,000 XI Corps (2 division): 20.000 33th, 37th infantry and 2nd Cavalry division: 10.000 IX Corps (3 division): 30.000 Turks have also 40,000 irregular cavalry (Turkish sources)	100,000 Firstly 45,000, 65,000 after arrival of 2nd Turkistan Corps[2]
Casualties and losses
12,000[3] 1,983 killed[3] 6,170 wounded[3] 3,070 taken prisoner[3] 2,800 deserted[3] Total: 14,023	40,000[3][4] 10,000 killed[3] 24,000 wounded[3] 6,000 died of exposure[3] Total: 40,000

When war was started, Russian has 25 battalions at Sarikamish, 8 battalions at Oltu, 5 battalions at Kağızman and 5 battalions at Kars. Russian also has 20 cavalry companies.[2] On the other hand, Turks has XI Corps' 2 divisions (18 Battalions) at Hasankale, IX Corps' 28th and 29th Divisions at Erzurum, IX Corps's 17th Division at İspir, XI Corps' 33th Division at Tutak, 37th Division (6 battalions) at Muş, X Corps' 30th Division at Sivas, 32nd Division at Samsun, 31st Division at Amasya. X Corps didn't participate Bergmann Offensive due to distance. 29th, 33th and 37th Divisions caught up battle on 11 November and 17th Division on 17 November. Turks initially has 33% infantry advantage (Russian Caucasian Army consist of 45,000 infantry and Turks 60,000) and Russian separated their army carelessly but Turks couldn't use this advantage due to precaution. Russians equalized numbers by starting to bring Turkistan Army Corps on 16 November. Turks obtained 50% infantry advantage by bringing 10th Corps (40,000 infantry) at the beginning of December.[6] This superiority of number encouraged Turks to perform Sarikamish Offensive.

At the outbreak of war, the Russians decided to occupy the Eleşkirt valley as a defensive measure to prevent the incursion of Kurdish Hamidiye units. The Russians considered the Turkish forces to be too weak to mount any offensive before winter weather would make any such offensive impossible, and no other offensive moves were intended by the Russian high command of the Caucasian army – their strategy envisaged an active defense against a locally superior force. However, local Russian commanders had the authority to authorize limited advances.[7]

On 2 November, Bergmann's troops crossed the border in the general direction of Köprüköy. The primary aim was to secure the Eleșkirt valley. On the right flank, 20th Infantry Division under Istomin moved from Oltu in the direction of İd.[5] On the left flank a Cossack division under Baratov moved into the Eleșkirt valley towards Yuzveran, after it crossed the Aras River.[5]

By 5 November Bergmann had completed the objectives expected of him. However, he expanded his mission by ordering further advances into Ottoman territory. By 6 November contact was made between the opposing armies, and heavy fighting continued into the 7th, with temporary Russian successes. Further Russian advances were held in check as a result of heavy fighting between 7 and 10 November. On 11 November Ottoman forces counterattacked and the Russian flanks quickly became at risk, forcing a Russian retreat. By the 12th they had retreated back to the lines they occupied on the 4th, and still at risk of being outflanked, further retreats followed. Only the arrival of Russian reinforcements headed by General Przevalski checked the situation and halted the Russian retreat. On 16–17 November Przevalski crossed the Aras river and at dawn attacked part of the Turkish XI Corps, halting their advance. After two more days the fighting finally petered out.[8]

Russian losses were 1,000 killed and 4,000 wounded, 1,000 men died of exposure[3](with the Bakinski regiment suffering 40% losses), while Turkish sources claimed that Russian losses were 40,000 killed and wounded, while the Ottomans lost 1,983 men killed, 6,170 wounded, 3,070 were taken prisoner, and 2,800 deserted.[3] Yudenich and his staff were disappointed by the unsuccessful attack. Turkish forces then crossed the border and, advancing into the lower Choruh valley, destroyed on 15 November a Russian column sent to protect the copper mines at Borçka, forcing the Russians to evacuate Borçka, Artvin and Ardanuç.[4] Turkish success during these first engagements encouraged Enver Pasha in his plan to attack at Sarıkamıș.[5][9]

Muratoff and Allen describe Bergman as "an officer who liked to imitate in appearance and manner the type of the old Caucasian hero-leaders", but who had "none of the qualities which are necessary as a commander; he had no experience of field operations, and was merely blindly obstinate when he thought to show strength of character".[10]

From Turkish Side

On 1 November, Russian crossed the border and started the move Erzurum. Turks' frontier guards couldn't detect power of Russian forces because they killed, routed or captured abruptly by Russians.[11] 3rd Army commander Hasan İzzet Pasha assumed that Russian offensive with superior forces was started. He ordered XI Corps to retreat Erzurum without learning magnitude of Russian army. XI Corps retreated hastily to Erzurum in two days. Hasan İzzet Pasha sent 2nd Cavalry Division (1300 swords) to exploration. On 4 November, Cavalry Division's commander lieutenant colonel Yusuf İzzet fought against Russian troops successfully in the Köprüköy village.[11] On the same day, Enver Pasha recommended Hasan İzzet to attack and annihilate separately moving Russian troops. For this reason, Hasan İzzet Pasha underestimated Russians and sent back XI Corps in a same hurry. On 6 November, Cavalry Division battled again Russian troops in the Köprüköy and retreated.[12] It detected Russians as 8 infantry battalions and one cavalry regiment.

Hasan izzet planned to rout this vanguard forces and retreat again to Erzurum fortifications. 7 November is rainy and foggy day. Two divisions of XI Corps moved from Hasankale to Russians supposed to be in east of Köprüköy but Russians came to Badicivan village 10 kilometers northwest of Köprüköy. One regiment of XI Corps fell into Russian heavy rifle and artillery fire. This regiment start to escape irregularly and panic passed other Turk troops. All XI Corps run off to Hasankale. Turk officers regularized XI Corps before long and sent back them to Russians but in this day, Turks couldn't make any progress. Second day Turks forced to retreat Russians from forward trenches. After the victory of 8 November, Hasan İzzet's German chief of staff lieutenant colonel Guse said Hasan İzzet "Best retreat is retreat after gaining success. We have been successful... If Russian attacks us with superior forces, it will be hard to hold in this trenches and retreat to Erzurum". Hasan İzzet accepted Guse's proposal and ordered to write retreat decree. XI Corps commander Galip Pasha said "I will resign if this decree applies. There is no reason for retreat. This decision demoralizes our soldiers". This decree was cancelled and tomorrow more position is captured.[13] Battles continued until 21 November. In the following days, Turks tried to encircle Russians from north with 29th Division and 33th Division from south. On 17 November, 33th Division was just 3,000 soldier and defeated by Przevalski's superior forces. 29th Division coincided inconvenient terrain; accordingly, they stopped easily by Russians. Also 29th Division didn't move away much from its main army. In fact, Hasan İzzet make encirclement on paper for convincing Enver.

Willingly Retreat

On 21 November, Turks regained 30 kilometers but Hasan İzzet decide to retreat 15 kilometers because he take some exaggerated information about Russian troops at side of Narman. He withdrew all armies on the night of 21 November. A terrible blizzard showed up. Hundreds of soldiers die from hypothermia and presence of Turks troops decreased by 50%. Russian couldn't estimate Turks will retreat because Turks have successfully fought for 2 weeks. Ziya Yergök says "If Russian would make use of this retreat, they could capture all our army by just one cavalry division". IX Corps commander Ahmet Fevzi Pasha criticized Hasan İzzet for this unnecessary retreat. Hasan İzzet Pasha want to approval from Enver Pasha for dismissing of Ahmet Fevzi Pasha by making excuse that "Although he is commanding one of the most privileged Corps of 3rd Army, he is pessimistic about result of the war". Enver Pasha gave the approval and Ahmet Fevzi Pasha was both dismissed and retired. 34th Division commander Ali İhsan Pasha appointed IX Corps commander by Hasan İzzet Pasha. This retreat caused to intrigue against Hasan İzzet Pasha. Enver Pasha wanted to see the situation on the scene council of ministers suggested that you should stay Istanbul and send a proxy in place of you because you are minister of war and vice-generalissimo. Enver Pasha sent second chief of staff Hafiz Hakki Pasha instead of himself but a few days later he also went to Turkish 3rd Army. This arrivals led to Sarikamish outflanking manoeuvre and pitched battle.

References

1. Rob Johnson. "The Great War and the Middle East". Oxford University. Page 156.
2. General Nikolski, Sarıkamış Harekatı, p. 3.
3. Eugene Rogan. The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East. Hachette UK. 2015. P. 78
4. W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields", Cambridge 1953, page 248.
5. Hinterhoff, Eugene (1984). The Campaign in Armenia. Marshall Cavendish Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War I, vol ii. New York: Marshall Cavendish Corporation. p. 500. ISBN 0-86307-181-3.
6. Köprülülü Şerif İlden, Sarıkamış, p. 161.
7. W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields", Cambridge 1953, page 242.
8. W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields", Cambridge 1953, pages 246-247.
9. Zayonchkovskiy, A. M. (2000). Первая мировая война (Pervaya mirovaya voyna) [World War I] (in Russian). Saint-Petersburg: Poligon. p. 878. ISBN 5-89173-082-0.
10. W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, "Caucasian Battlefields", Cambridge 1953, page 244.
11. Köprülülü Şerif İlden, Sarıkamış, p. 56.
12. İlden, Sarıkamış, p. 68-71.
13. Birinci Dünya Savaşında Kafkas Cephesinde Muharebeler, yazan Alman Yarbay Guze, çev. Yarbay Hakkı (Akoğuz), p. 28.